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"WE THE PEOPLE" 
AND OUR ENDURING VALUES 
Susan Bandes* 
THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCI­
PLES. By Akhil Reed Amar. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
1997. Pp. xi, 272. $30. 
Let me give you a lesson in American history: James Madison never 
intended the Bill of Rights to protect riffraff like you.1 
Akhil Amar2 chides legal scholars for believing that the current 
system of criininal procedure, both substantive and remedial, is 
constitutionally compelled. He writes, "Scholars should know bet­
ter, but too few of those who write in criminal procedure do serious, 
sustained scholarship in constitutional law generally, or in fields like 
federal jurisdiction and remedies" (p. 115). Amar believes, as I do,3 
that criininal procedure has been impoverished by its failure to con­
nect to "larger themes of constitutional, remedial and jurisdictional 
theory" (p. 115). But as one who has done serious, sustained schol­
arship in all the areas Amar mentions - or so I like to think - I 
have grave concerns about Amar's first principles and their reme­
dial implications. As an admirer of his work in the field of federal 
jurisdiction, I have been deeply puzzled by his treatment of the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, which is fundamentally at 
odds with his attitude toward the substantive and remedial struc­
ture of the remainder of the Constitution. 
My thesis is that Amar has been led astray by the very fact that 
these amendments are about criininal procedure. His attitude to­
ward crime and criminals has led him to conclude that the first prin­
ciples underlying the criininal procedure amendments are the 
protection of the innocent and the pursuit of truth. Indeed, he con­
flates even these two principles, so that the pursuit of truth becomes 
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. B.A. 1973, Buffalo; J.D. 1976, 
University of Michigan. - Ed. I wish to thank Erwin Chemerinsky, Thomas Davies, Barry 
Friedman, and Stephan Landsman for their helpful comments; Michael Carter, Julie DiCaro, 
Marlo Johnson and Manuel Rupe for their research assistance; and the DePaul Law School 
faculty research fund for its support. 
1. J.B. Handelsman, NEw YORKER, Aug. 13, 1990, at 35 (caption in cartoon depicting 
judge talking to defendant). 
2. Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
3. See Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State's Right to a Fair Trial, 
60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1019, 1020-21, 1053 {1987). 
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another way of saying that the innocent must be sorted from the 
guilty. Amar's monolithic focus on protecting the innocent is 
wrongheaded as a matter of constitutional text, history, structure, 
and spirit. It has led him to make startling claims about the reach , 
of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments and the remedies that 
ought to flow from their violation.4 
It is important to examine Amar's claims carefully for a number 
of reasons. First, Amar is absolutely correct about the need to dis­
cuss the values animating constitutional criminal procedure. 
Amar's ambition is nothing less than to "fundamentally reorient the 
field" (p. ix). He is energetic and fearless in his determination to 
examine a concededly ingrown, contradictory, and polarized field 
from a fresh perspective. He seeks to take nothing for granted, and 
he does succeed in raising hard questions about some of the Warren 
Court's conventional wisdom. It seems de rigeur to refer to Amar's 
analysis as provocative,5 and surely he would not excite so much 
critical comment if he had not hit a nerve. Amar deserves apprecia­
tion for taking great intellectual risks. He is correct that it is time to 
take a long, careful look at the current state of criminal procedure 
and ask whether we are comfortable with the values and interests it 
embodies, whether it is a workable system, and where it fits in the 
greater constitutional scheme. 
Second, it is important to respond to Amar's substantive analy­
sis because it rests on assumptions that are disturbingly ascendant 
in current criminal jurisprudence. Amar's analysis must be cri­
tiqued for its misidentification of the values of innocence and truth 
seeking as animating the criminal procedure amendments, its focus 
on ultimate disposition and away from process, its unworkable re­
medial proposals, and its consistent undervaluing of the concern 
with the abuse of governmental power. Ironically, despite Amar's 
sense of his scholarship in this area as revolutionary, the same val­
ues and assumptions he espouses have increasingly informed the 
Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence. In my opinion, this ap-
4. For example, he advocates jettisoning the warrant and probable cause requirements in 
favor of a flexible reasonableness analysis that he argues would permit more direct recogni­
tion of the innocence-protecting, truth-seeking values he espouses - and then jettisoning the 
exclusionary rule for violations of this reasonableness standard. Pp. 31-45. He advocates 
admitting virtually all physical fruits of compelled testimony because of their reliability, and 
compelling criminal suspects to testify in pretrial hearings. P. 47. He comes perilously close 
to suggesting that the right to counsel is a right against erroneous conviction of the innocent, 
rather than a right belonging to all those accused of crime. Pp. 138-41. 
5. See Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: 
"Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again," 74 N.C. L. REv. 1559, 1562 (1996); Yale 
Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testi­
mony, 93 MICH. L. REv. 929, 930 (1995); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth 
Amendment is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 1 (1994); Carol S. Steiker, 
Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 820, 821 (1994). 
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proach signals a deeply unfortunate turning away from "enduring 
values that Americans can recognize as our values" (p. 155). 
Finally, it is important to respond to Amar's analysis because it 
is Amar's analysis. He is a highly respected legal scholar with a 
well-deserved reputation for brilliant iconoclasm. His early works 
advocated a generous and attractive vision of full remediation for 
governmental wrongs, and indeed this theme recurs in his current 
work. Yet, despite his stated desire to integrate the criminal proce­
dure amendments into the Constitution as a whole, his vision for 
these amendments is far less generous or attractive. More accu­
rately, its superficial attractiveness lies in its appeal to simplicity 
and "common sense" - dangerous attributes when they jibe so 
neatly with the reflexive us/them attitude that too often pervades 
debate in this area. In practice, Amar's proposals would weaken 
greatly the substantive and remedial structure undergirding the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. Amar has testified in Con­
gress and elsewhere on these issues, advocating, among other 
things, an end to the exclusionary rule.6 Such testimony coming 
from one viewed as a liberal, civil libertarian law professor is ex­
tremely powerful - and extremely troubling. Thus, the disjunction 
between Amar's views on protections for noncriminal litigants and 
his views about criminal defendants must be illuminated. 
I. "WE THE PEOPLE" AND OUR ENDURING VALUES 
Amar's chapter on the future of constitutional criminal proce­
dure contains a key paragraph about his interpretive vision for this 
field: 
A Constitution proclaimed in the name of We the People should be 
rooted in enduring values that Americans can recognize as our values. 
Truth and the protection of innocence are such values. Virtually 
everything in the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments, properly read, 
promotes, or at least does not betray, these values. [p. 155] 
This paragraph cries out for the punch line: "What do you 
mean, we?" I do not mean this comment glibly. Amar's assump­
tions about what we value, and indeed about who we are, are deeply 
problematic. Amar claims, here and throughout the book, to be 
describing societal values that are both deeply rooted in history and 
at the core of contemporary concerns. To the extent he roots his 
claim for enduring values in the concerns of the Founders, his his­
torical analysis is unpersuasive. It suffers from precisely the same 
flaw as does his analysis of the contemporary factors shaping the 
evolution of the criminal procedure amendments: it consistently 
underplays or even denigrates the concern for the abuse of govern-
6. See Senate Committee Considers Replacing Exclusionary Rule with Civil Remedy, 56 
CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 1545-47 (Mar. 15, 1995). 
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mental power. This concern is our value in the sense that it 
animated the framers, and in the sense that it has endured. Tue 
exclusive focus on truth and innocence reads out the values of fair­
ness, judicial integrity, equality, and, most of all, the political con­
cern for the abuse of government power that - I will argue - are 
the enduring values we do and should recognize as our values. 
When Amar fails to include the fear of abuse as one of our en­
during values, it is important to understand how he defines the 
"We." He consistently uses the phrase "We the People" to describe 
innocent people, as, for example, when he suggests that instead of 
excluding tainted evidence, damages ought to be assessed to com­
fort victims of violent crimes, which would "be more apt to make 
the people 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects' than 
would freeing murderers and rapists."7 There is "We the People," 
and then there are the criminals. 
There are a number of problems with a theory of criminal pro­
cedure that rests on separating the innocent from the guilty and 
ensuring that innocent people are protected and guilty people are 
not. Even assuming that truth and innocence are the values that 
belong at the pinnacle of the hierarchy, Amar makes several errors. 
He employs a simplistic, whodunit version of the concept of inno­
cence. In addition, although he identifies the pursuit of truth as a 
primary value, he conflates the pursuit of truth with the protection 
of innocence. Finally, his chronology is problematic: he assumes 
that innocence can be determined prior to determining what pro­
tections are due. 
A. When Truth and Innocence Are Overrated 
[T]he thing is, you don't have many suspects who are innocent of a 
crime . . . . If a person is innocent of a crime, then he is not a suspect. 
-Remarks of Attorney General Edwin Meese8 
In exalting the value of innocence protection, Amar has signed 
on to one of the fastest growing, and most dangerous, trends in con­
temporary criminal jurisprudence: the trend toward separating the 
innocent from the guilty before determining what protections to af­
ford. Taken to its logical extreme, it has the potential to gut consti­
tutional protection for those accused of crime. 
7. P. 29. In Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 
1180 (1991), Amar says that "the core rights of 'the people' were popular and populist rights 
- rights which the popular body of the jury was well suited to vindicate," as opposed to 
countermajoritarian rights. As I will discuss later, this assessment bodes ill for the protection 
of unpopular groups such as those accused of crime, as well as racial minorities and the poor. 
See infra text accompanying notes 134-39. 
8. Quoted in Reagan Seeks Judge with "Traditional Approach," U.S NEWS & WoRLD 
REP., Oct. 14, 1985, at 67. 
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Consider the Fourth Amendment. In a group of cases in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s dealing with the definition of a search 
and the requirements for standing - a group of cases that Amar 
calls "one sensible comer of current Fourth Amendment law" (p. 
112) - the Court transformed the Katz v. United States9 reasonable 
expectation of privacy test into a legitimate expectation of privacy 
test. Whereas Katz itself had found a reasonable expectation of pri­
vacy in the contents of a phone call, despite the fact that the call 
concerned illegal gambling activities, United States v. Jacobsen10 and 
United States v. Place11 put a moral spin on the reasonableness stan­
dard. These cases held that a suspect had no legitimate expectation 
of privacy in illegal activity - that he could assert a Fourth Amend­
ment claim only to the extent that the government intruded on his 
noncriminal activities. In Rawlings v. Kentucky, 12 the Court held 
that a suspect had no legitimate possessory interest in contraband 
and thus could not complain about the seizure of that contraband, 
though he was ultimately convicted of its possession.13 
In short, the question of whether a defendant can claim Fourth 
Amendment protection now hinges on whether the defendant can 
show, at the outset, that his noncriminal activities were intruded 
upon. The focus is squarely on the nature of the interest asserted, 
rather than on whether society ought to tolerate the techniques po­
lice use to intrude upon these "illegitimate" interests.14 
9. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
10. 466 U.S. 109, 121-22 (1984). 
11. 462 U.S. 696, 701-02 (1983). 
12. 448 U.S. 98, 104·06 (1980). 
13. John Burkoff refers to this result as a classic example of Orwellian doublethink. See 
John M. Burkoff, When ls a Search Not a "Search?" Fourth Amendment Doublethink, 15 U. 
ToL. L. REv. 515, 535-37 (1984). 
14. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 140-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also 
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (refusing, for lack of standing, to review a gov­
ernment sting operation that included hiring a female private detective to entertain a Baha­
mian bank official so that IRS agents could steal his briefcase, photocopy over 400 
documents, and use the contents against the suspect). The Court's refusal to suppress the 
evidence in Payner came despite the fact that the sting was organized precisely to take advan­
tage of the fact that neither man would have standing to challenge the misconduct. See 447 
U.S. at 742-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary 
Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather Than an "Empirical Proposition?" 16 CREIGHTON 
L. REv. 565, 636-38 (1983) (condemning the Payner decision on these grounds); see also 
Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (refusing to adopt a rule against pretextual 
searches); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (permitting unregulated searches of 
open fields on suspect's property by focusing on the suspect's reasonable expectations, rather 
than the need to control police intrusions); United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981) 
(holding that, absent prejudice, dismissal of indictment was inappropriate though investiga­
tor's meeting with defendant outside counsel's presence and suggestion that defendant retain 
different counsel was a deliberate violation of the Sixth Amendment); United States v. 
Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that conduct of law enforcement officers 
in eavesdropping on conversations between defendant and his counsel was not reversible 
error absent prejudice). 
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Amar approves of this line of cases15 because it advances the 
value he identifies as most important: protecting the innocent. He 
would call these police actions searches and seizures, but would find 
them reasonable because he believes reasonableness incorporates 
the "common sense" intuition that the Fourth Amendment protects 
law abiding citizens and victims, not criminals. He says: 
And the reason these searches were reasonable is that, although they 
could ruin a drug runner's day, they posed little threat to the privacy 
interests of law abiding folk. Lawbreakers as such have no legitimate 
interest in privacy, and are at times entitled to less peace of mind than 
are the law-abiding. [pp. 112-13] , , 
Whether the introduction of the evidence is achieved through 
narrow definitions of search, expansive definitions of reasonable­
ness, or eviscerating the exclusionary rule, each of these paths leads 
to the same troublesome destination: a belief that it is possible and 
desirable to identify the guilty prior to trial - and indeed prior to 
the suppression ruling - and to deny them the right to complain 
about governmental misconduct.16 This belief is based on a credu­
lous acceptance of the possibility of intruding only upon the "illegit­
imate" interests of guilty suspects and a recasting of the criminal 
procedure amendments as personal rights of the good guys. The 
case law exhibits a utopian - or dystopian - faith in the possibility 
that technology can find ways to discern only illegal activities, with­
out intruding upon legitimate privacy expectations - a faith appar­
ently unshaken by technology's failure to rise to the challenge,17 or 
by the danger of post-hoc justification. Indeed, as Justice Brennan 
15. To be precise, he does not approve of classifying the police actions as "nonsearches" 
and "nonseizures." He calls current definitions of search and seizure narrow and "unjusti­
fied" (p. 19) and argues in favor of expanding them in order to bring more conduct within the 
Fourth Amendment. He would, however, uphold the searches and seizures as reasonable. In 
addition, he would not exclude the fruits of such searches, even if the searches were found 
unreasonable, because "contraband or stolen goods . . .  were never one's property to begin 
with .. . .  " P. 22. 
16. As the Red Queen said: "Sentence first - verdict aftenvard." LEWIS CARROLL, AL­
ICE IN WONDERLAND 137 (Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 1946) (1865). 
17. The dog sniff cases provide an illustration of the fallibility of methods designed to 
expose only illegal interests. In United States v. Lyons, 957 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1992), the court 
confronted the case of a drug-detecting dog who became agitated and tore the package in 
two, spewing the contents on the floor and ingesting cocaine. The court determined that the 
dog's conduct could be likened to a "natural occurrence" and could not be attributed to the 
police - thus, no search had occurred. There have also been numerous cases in which such 
dogs have badly bitten their quarry, and one in which a dog killed a burglary suspect. See 
David G. Savage, When Bites Are Worse Than Barks, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1996, at 38; Robinette 
v. Barnes, 854 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1988). Even if the "sniff" goes as planned, moreover, it 
cannot be separated neatly from the intrusions that accompany it. See United States v. Place, 
462 U.S. 696, 710 (1983) (holding that seizure of luggage during 90-minute wait for dog to 
arrive was unreasonable); Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting 
from denial of cert.) (arguing that dog sniff of high school students is an unconstitutional 
se'arch). See also Kamisar, supra note 5, at 960-64 (advocating that intrusion must be evalu­
ated in light of entire chain of events). 
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pointed out, the focus on the illegitimate product of the search 
threatens the fundamental principle that "[a] search prosecuted in 
violation of the Constitution is not made lawful by what it brings to 
light."18 
On a similar note, in his discussions of Gideon v. Wainwright19 
and the right to counsel in both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
contexts, Amar makes plain his belief that the only true purpose of 
supplying counsel is to ensure that the innocent are not wrongly 
convicted. In the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination context, his 
concern is with the possibility of an unreliable confession - one 
elicited from a defendant who is actually innocent. He believes that 
out-of-court protections should be keyed to minimizing this danger. 
Thus, he advocates a supervised, civilized "deposition approach" to 
interrogation, coupled with compulsion for suspects to talk truth­
fully (pp. 76-77). 
Though Amar's proposals in the Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
contexts diverge significantly from current law, the seeds are there. 
The ever-expanding notion of harmless error reflects the belief that 
so long as the trial verdict correctly separates the innocent from the 
guilty, constitutional error during the trial need not be addressed.20 
Recently, in Arizona v. Fulminante,21 the Court even extended 
harmless error analysis to the admission at trial of coerced confes­
sions. Strickland v. Washington22 held that ineffective assistance of 
counsel is not reversible error unless it likely affected the outcome 
of the trial. Innocence appears to be on an inexorable rise to the 
top of the vaJues hierarchy - except, ironically, when to recognize 
innocence would expand, rather than contract, the rights of 
defendants.23 
18. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 140 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Byars v. United States, 
273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927)); see also United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (holding that 
a post-hoc justification for a search is impermissible). Amar notes with at least a hint of 
approval that at co=on law, ex post facto success was a complete defense to an unlawful 
search or seizure. P. 7. 
19. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
20. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (rejecting rule that all constitutional 
violations constitute reversible error); see also WAYNER. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 27.6 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing harmless error doctrines); Tom Stacy 
& Kim Dayton, Rethinking Hannless Constitutional Error, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 79 (1988) 
(critiquing Supreme Court's harmless error jurisprudence); Daniel B. Yeager, Categorical 
and Individualized Rights-Ordering on Federal Habeas Corpus, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 669, 
709 (1994) ("Between 1967, when the Court decided Chapman v. California, and 1991, when 
it decided Arizona v. Fulminante, the range of constitutional trial errors forgivable on appeal 
went from none to nearly all."). 
21. 499 U.S. 279 (1991). 
22. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
23. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (holding that absent exceptional cir­
cumstances a claim of actual innocence is not by itself sufficient reason for a federal court to 
entertain a habeas petition, because it does not rise to the level of a constitutional claim); see 
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In this section, I will discuss two major objections to identifying 
innocence as one of our core values. First, Amar's conception of 
innocence is simplistic and unworkable, and his belief in the possi­
bility of sorting the innocent from the guilty before determining 
what process is due is both unrealistic and ill-advised. Second, 
there are serious normative problems with claiming innocence­
protection as a core constitutional value - either historically or 
currently. 
The first step in illustrating the dangers of enshrining innocence 
is to examine Amar's use of the term. Amar treats innocence es­
sentially as the question of "did he do it or not?" The innocent in 
his world are those who did not commit murders, rapes, armed rob­
beries, and other violent crimes: those who are or could be 
threatened by the murderers and rapists.24 
There are several problems with basing an overarching theory of 
criminal procedure on such notions of innocence. First, notice that 
Amar's paradigmatic guilty person is a murderer or other violent 
felon. Indeed, the murderer's bloody knife appears again and again 
in the pages of this book.25 Yet empirical data indicates that the 
exclusionary rule that is the target of many of Amar's policy argu­
ments has almost no negative impact on the prosecution of these 
violent crimes. To the minimal extent that evidence is suppressed, 
suppression occurs most often in drug cases.26 
Second, as the reach of criminal law expands, it becomes more 
and more difficult to isolate Amar's paradigmatic innocent person. 
In 1954, Professor Louis Shwartz observed, "The paradoxical fact is 
that arrest, conviction, and punishment of every criminal would be 
a catastrophe. Hardly one of us would escape, for we have all at 
also Susan Bandes, Simple Murder: A Comment on the Legality of Executing the Innocent, 44 
BUFF. L. REv. 501 (1996) (discussing Herrera). 
24. The book is replete with comments like: "even a good lawyer cannot always save an 
innocent but unpersuasive-sounding client from being demolished on the stand," p. 85; "even 
an innocent person may say seemingly inculpatory things under pressure and suspicion and 
when flustered by trained inquisitors," p. 71; "indictments can at times be laced with techni­
cal legal language that an accused person - especially, perhaps, if wholly innocent (say, in a 
case of mistaken identity) - may not understand," p. 139; and "to throw out highly reliable 
evidence that can indeed help us separate the innocent from the guilty - and to throw it out 
by pointing to the Constitution, no less - is constitutional madness," p. 155. 
25. See, e.g., pp. 26, 30, 160. 
26. See Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) 
About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The Nil Study and Other Studies of "Lost" 
Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 611, 614-15, 637-38; Yale Kamisar, "Comparative Repre­
hensibility" and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1, 26 n.120, 27-
28 (1987); Maclin, supra note 5, at 44; see also The Jury and the Search for Truth: The Case 
Against Excluding Relevant Evidence at Trial: Hearing on S. 3 Before the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 143 (1995) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Prof. Thomas Y. 
Davies) (positing that if similar statistics were available and analyzed today, they would re­
flect an even lower number of lost arrests, due to the more flexible probable cause standard 
and the good faith exception). 
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one time or another committed acts that the law regards as serious 
offenses."27 'The difficulties in remaining "innocent" have multi­
plied in the past several decades. 'The Court permits various intru­
sions, including custodial arrest, for a host of minor traffic 
infractions, such as driving with a burned-out tail light or license 
plate light, failing to signal a turn, driving seven miles over the 
speed limit, or having a loud muffler.28 Cars may be pulled over at 
sobriety checkpoints.29 Even pedestrians are not exempt from the 
long arm of the law.3° 'The growing administrative state offers nu­
merous opportunities to violate regulatory statutes.31 Homes may 
be searched for faulty wiring,32 students may be searched for ciga­
rettes,33 and back yards may be surveilled for marijuana plants.34 
Can any one of us confidently claim long-term innocence in the face 
of so many opportunities to become a lawbreaker?35 
Finally, even if we confine the conversation to the paradigmatic 
violent felon, the hurdles are insuperable. For one, Amar's view 
ignores the degrees of culpability and the degrees of punishment 
that must be assessed in, for example, a homicide investigation. 
Michael Seidman said it well: 
Since ultimate truths, even of the factual variety, are notoriously elu­
sive, separating the innocent sheep from the guilty goats can be a dif­
ficult task. Moreover, much of the system's time and effort is often 
diverted from this task to the infinitely more subtle and intractable 
job of differentiating between types of goats. Even if the defendant is 
guilty, the questions remain how guilty he is and what we should do 
with him.36 
27. Louis B. Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA. L. 
REv. 157, 157 {1954). 
28. See Carol M. Bast, Driving While Black: Stopping Motorists on a Subterfuge, 33 
CRIM. L. BULL. 457, 482-86 app. A {1997). See also David Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority 
Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SuP. CT. REv. 271, 298·99 (observ­
ing that because almost everyone violates traffic rules sometimes, this means that the police, 
if they are patient, can eventually pull over anyone they are interested in questioning). 
29. See Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 {1990). 
30. See Norimitsu Onishi, Giuliani Crows as Theft Suspect is Caught on Jay Walking 
Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1998, at Bl Gaywalker unable to produce identification was 
brought to station, found to be a robbery suspect, placed in a lineup, and booked). 
31. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 {1987). 
32. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
33. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 {1985). 
34. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 {1985). 
35. Moreover, even those who have broken no law at all are at risk of being subjected, 
albeit mistakenly, to overbearing police tactics. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, Reprise of Terror, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1998, at A25 (recounting two completely mistaken police intrusions on 
the same day in each of which the police conduct was shocking and egregious). 
36. Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Con· 
tinuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 436, 441 {1980) (emphasis 
added). 
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A defendant who unquestionably has committed a homicide may 
be exonerated for acting in self-defense or convicted of voluntary or 
involuntary manslaughter. What, for example, would Amar do with 
a case like Spano v. New York?37 Spano, a 25-year-old, unsophisti­
cated, emotionally unstable immigrant with a poor command of 
English, was indicted for capital murder. Spano did not involve 
strong-arm tactics that led to a false confession. The defendant 
really did kill the deceased, and eyewitness testimony was available 
to corroborate his confession. Instead, the case involved uncon­
scionable police tactics which overbore the defendant's will, includ­
ing lying and betrayal by a police officer who he thought was his 
close friend, repeated denials of his requests to see his attorney, and 
nearly twelve hours of incessant nighttime questioning. Spano 
showed the value of a confession to law enforcement - it enabled 
prosecutors to add to their homicide case Spano's statements that 
the deceased was always "on his back," "always pushing" him, and 
that he was "not sorry" he had shot him. What might have been 
voluntary manslaughter or even self-defense could now be prose­
cuted successfully as first-degree murder. Is there room in Amar's 
world view for gradations of factual innocence, or does the fact that 
Spano really did shoot and kill a man irrevocably categorize him as 
guilty? 
Amar's attitude toward factual innocence reminds me of a ques­
tion that countless laypeople asked me when I was an appellate de­
fender: how could I defend people I knew were guilty? An 
example I often used to illustrate the difficulty of "knowing" 
whether my clients were guilty, despite the fact that they had all 
been convicted of felonies, was my defense of Rosa Bennett. Ms. 
Bennett was a battered woman who unquestionably had shot and 
killed her husband. Ms. Bennett testified that her husband had 
come home drunk and had physically and verbally abused her over 
a period of several hours. In doing so, he tore and bloodied her 
sweatshirt. In fear for her life, she shot him. The state claimed 
that, contrary to Bennett's assertion, it did not have in its posses­
sion her tom and bloodied sweatshirt that would have corroborated 
her claim that her husband had attacked her. Indeed, the state's 
case rested on the lack of any physical evidence supporting Ben­
nett's claim that she had acted in self-defense. Fortunately, an in­
ventory slip revealed that the state indeed had taken the sweatshirt 
from the crime scene. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed her 
conviction.38 Even so, Bennett was not ultimately found "factually 
innocent." She was convicted of voluntary manslaughter rather 
than murder and was released from prison immediately rather than 
37. 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
38. See People v. Bennett, 402 N.E.2d 650 (Ill. Ct. App. 1980). 
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serving several additional years. Does she fall into the group of 
law-abiding innocents whom Amar finds worthy of protection, or is 
she one of the lawbreakers who receive such benefits as right to 
counsel and right to discovery only as an unavoidable byproduct of 
their provision to the law-abiding? 
The descriptive problems with identifying the innocent are ac­
companied by another obstacle: the chronology problem. At what 
point should it be determined who are the innocent who are worthy 
of constitutional protection, and who are the guilty who are unwor­
thy? It is often impossible, as it was with Rosa Bennett or Joseph 
Spano, to separate the effects of evidentiary rulings from the ulti­
mate degree of guilt or innocence. The difficulty of making this 
determination at the outset was one salient lesson of the evolution 
from Betts v. Brady39 to Gideon v. Wainwright, 40 an evolution of 
which Amar speaks with approval (p. 140). Because Clarence Earl 
Gideon had a retrial, with counsel, in which witnesses were ade­
quately cross-examined and the jury was introduced to the state's 
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it was possible 
to determine that he had been wrongly convicted in his first triaJ.41 
How will we ever know whether Betts was wrongly convicted?42 
The concept of guilt or innocence gives no guidance in determining 
his need for counsel. Amar and the current Supreme Court would 
agree that a Gideon violation cannot be harmless error, but they 
both miss the larger lesson - that the concept of innocence pro­
vides no coherent measure of what procedures ought to be followed 
pretrial or at trial. 
Amar claims innocence as a core value of the framers as well as 
of contemporary society. Yet Amar's conception of innocence is 
especially ironic and troubling because it is so relentlessly apolitical 
and ahistorical. The colonists whose victimization led to the 
Revolution were, for the most part, guilty as charged. They did 
smuggle molasses for the manufacture of rum as well as other con­
traband, and they did violate the seditious libel laws. Their factual 
innocence was hardly the source for the outrage of the colonists. 
39. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
40. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
41. See .ANraoNY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 234-50 (Vintage Books 1989) (1964). 
42. In an article in the 1962 University of Chicago Law Review, Professor Kamisar took a 
fascinating and extensive look at the record of the Betts trial. He found the record to be rife 
with error - suggestive lineup, failure to exclude witnesses from the courtroom while other 
witnesses testified, possible fabrication of evidence, ambiguous identification, failure to sum­
mon key subpoenaed witnesses, and more. In addition to error, the record reflects innumera­
ble lost opportunities to make a stronger defense - failures to call certain witnesses, failures 
to cross-examine, Betts's own decision not to take the stand, failures to object to evidence, 
and Betts's questionable decision to use an alibi defense, among others. See Yale Kamisar, 
The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive 
Right" of an Accused, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 42-56 (1962). 
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The outrage stemmed from official repression and abuse - in the 
way the crimes were defined, in the way investigations were con­
ducted, and in the way convictions were obtained. Perhaps Amar 
would like to argue that those were political dissidents, not real 
criminals like our current rapists and murderers, and that therefore 
they were entitled to protections to which current real criminals are 
not entitled. But he makes no case for the claim that the concern 
for official lawlessness animating the Founders differs in kind from 
the concern for official lawlessness that continues to affect our soci­
ety today.43 
What degree of liberty would our citizens - including our less 
powerful citizens - experience under Amar's proposals? The dan­
gers of Amar's focus on innocence are well illustrated by the wide­
spread problem of racially and sexually discriminatory law 
enforcement. Amar makes a powerful claim for his proposals -
that they will better enable questions of racial and sexual discrimi­
nation to be taken seriously (p. 150). But if this is the goal, his 
analysis will have - to use his phrase - an "upside-down effect" 
(p. 28). As I will discuss in detail below, the Court currently uses 
innocence as a way of avoiding questions of racial pretext, discrimi­
natory enforcement, bad faith, sexual harassment, and other forms 
of official abuse. The focus on innocence is a very poor means of 
achieving equality of treatment; instead, it works to inhibit it.44 
One final significant problem with the focus on innocence is that 
it ignores the concept of reasonable doubt. Amar treats the notion 
of innocence as if it were objectively ascertainable, rather than an 
often difficult task of sorting out conflicting and ambiguous evi­
dence. Indeed, if factual innocence were as readily ascertainable as 
Amar suggests, it might raise questions about the need to give the 
state a handicap. Amar makes statements such as: "[W]e must re­
member that integrity and fairness are also threatened by excluding 
evidence that will help the justice system to reach a true verdict" (p. 
43. Consider the words of Professor Louis Schwartz: 
Make no mistake about it. These are not rules for the protection of the innocent alone. 
They are rules which operate and were intended to operate before anyone could decide 
whether the suspect was innocent or guilty . . . . Their particular usefulness to the 
"guilty" is no accident, for many of these rules were written into the Constitution by real 
"criminals," fresh from experience as smugglers, tax evaders, seditionists and traitors to 
the regime of George III. Theirs was no mawkish sentimentality for miscreants. They 
understood, as we must understand, that the law enforcement net cannot be tightened 
for the guilty without enmeshing the innocent; that decent law enforcement is possible 
without impairing the bulwarks against injustice and tyranny; and that the worth of a 
society will eventually be reckoned not in proportion to the number of criminals it cruci­
fies, burns, hangs or imprisons, but rather by the degree of liberty experienced by the 
great body of its citizenry. There have never been more determined law enforcers than 
Nazi Germany or the Soviet [Union]. 
Schwartz, supra note 27, at 158. 
44. Amar suggests that the reasonableness focus will permit courts to focus on equality of 
treatment. Here, too, his logic is upside-down. See infra text accompanying notes 83-104. 
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25). What Amar fails to acknowledge is that, given the difficulties 
and ambiguities of weighing the evidence, and the impossibility of 
omniscience, a tiebreaker is needed. Further, he simply seems to 
reject the notion that the tie should go to the defendant - that it is 
better to let several guilty men go free than to convict one who is 
innocent. 
Amar pays tentative lip service to the state's burden, but he ap­
pears uncomfortable with it.45 Amar does not seem to accept that 
the state's burden reflects and flows from the recognition that the 
Bill of Rights exists to help correct a severe power imbalance be­
tween the defendant and the awesome power and massed resources 
of the state.46 This power imbalance, which Amar recognizes and 
decries in every other area of scholarship,47 is invisible in his work 
on criminal procedure. The world he describes here is one in which 
the state and the defendant are on an equal footing in the contest to 
establish the truth.48 Indeed, any burdens and presumptions that 
do exist should work in favor of the prosecution: 
Given the almost metaphysical difficulties in knowing whether the 
bloody knife or some evidentiary substitute would have come to light 
anyway, should not the law strongly presume that somehow, some 
way, sometime, the truth would come out? Criminals get careless or 
cocky; conspirators rat; neighbors come forward; cops get lucky; the 
truth outs; and justice reigns - or so our courts should presume, and 
any party seeking to suppress truth and thwart justice should bear a 
heavy burden of proof. [pp. 26-27] 
This quotation brings us face to face with, not just Amar's concep­
tion of innocence, but his conceptions of truth and justice. Let us 
tum to an examination of truth, and its interactions with innocence 
and justice, in Amar's hierarchy of values. 
Amar says that the pursuit of truth and the protection of inno­
cence are the first principles animating the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments. But when he talks about the pursuit of truth, it be­
comes clear that it, too, is merely a subsidiary of the primary value 
- protecting the innocent. For example, he refers to "the basic 
trial value of truth seeking - sorting the innocent from the guilty" 
(p. 3). He criticizes "modem doctrines that - in the name of the 
Constitution, no less - exclude evidence the public knows to be 
true" (p. 119). He goes on to say that "the gap between public truth 
and truth allowed in the courtroom can demoralize the public, 
45. See, e.g., p. 142 ("Counsel's line here is a fine one - between asking questions that 
imply factual innocence and asking questions that merely imply reasonable doubt - but, in 
principle, a workable one.") . 
. 46. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); Bandes, 
supra note 3, at 1032. 
47. See infra notes 105 and 106 and accompanying text. 
48. See Bandes, supra note 3, at 1022-31. 
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whose faith in the judicial system is a key goal of the public trial 
ideal" (p. 119); and again: "Truth and accuracy are vital values. A 
procedural system that cannot sort the innocent from the guilty will 
confound any set of substantive laws, however just. And so to 
throw out highly reliable evidence that can indeed help us separate 
the innocent from the guilty . . .  is constitutional madness" (p. 155). 
Thus, truth, accuracy, and reliability seem to possess no identity 
independent of their service to the ideal of protecting the innocent. 
Truth becomes another way of asking whether the suspect really did 
what he is accused of doing. Each trial is an individual exercise in 
assuring that the correct person is put behind bars - nothing 
more. 49 Amar's equation of this exercise with the public interest is 
especially interesting, because it suggests that societal values are �f­
firmed by a just conviction. This comment in itself would not be 
startling, but there is no counterbalancing recognition that the pub­
lic interest is served by any values that do not promote sorting the 
innocent from the guilty. 
Let's examine these values in the context of the jury trial. If the 
sole duty of the trier of fact were to establish factual innocence, 
then the jury would not be the best body to perform this duty. The 
jury symbolizes societal willingness to risk nonconviction for the 
sake of other values. One such value is the community's ability to 
mete out justice or exercise mercy on a local level. If the trier of 
fact were expected merely to weigh the proof and apply the law, a 
judge would be able to perform this duty at least as well as a jury. 
Amar recognizes this. He talks at length of the colonists' distrust of 
magistrates, for example, and their preference for juries, who, pre­
sumably, would nullify the oppressive laws of the Crown. 50 He says 
the proper response to crime is not merely good factfinding but 
moral judgment by the community via the jury (p. 124). The ques­
tion then becomes, if a jury trial is important for reasons other than 
determining factual innocence, what are those reasons? 
Perhaps Amar addresses this issue by his use of the phrase "nor­
mative innocence," which he defines as "I did it, but I did not 
thereby offend the public's moral code," in contrast to "factual in­
nocence," which he defines as "I didn't do it" (p. 90). But it is diffi­
cult to tell what "normative innocence" encompasses. If the phrase 
encompasses values that provide a counterweight to factual inno-
49. In the criminal context, Amar seems oddly derisive of the idea that the trial serves a 
public norm-creation function. See, for example, his discussion of the "Leavenworth lot­
tery," pp. 157-58, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 178-180. 
50. Pp. 11-12. He also argues that the jury is less corruptible than the judge, and that fear 
of judicial corruption was a major reason for the colonial preference for jury trials. P: -121. 
Tracey Maclin argues that Amar's history is incomplete and selective and that the vast major­
ity of colonial judges refused to issue writs in the face of demands by the Crown, though it 
meant risking their livelihood. See Maclin, supra note 5, at 21-25. 
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cence, such as all the moral, political, visceral, and other community 
values a jury might bring to bear, does this also lead to a concept of 
normative truth - a truth which is moral and political, as well as 
factual? If so, how does Amar square this with his evident faith 
that guilt and innocence are objectively ascertainable? Moreover, if 
finding the truth becomes a moral rather than a factual search, 
which might lead to acquitting a factually guilty person because of 
government oppression, then why should this idea of truth not en­
compass other nonaccuracy values, such as the need to exclude op­
pressively gained evidence to preserve judicial integrity? 
Amar talks frequently about evidence the public knows to be 
true or that will help the justice system reach a true verdict. He 
does not come to terms with some essential truths about the trial­
related rights - that they set up hurdles for the government in or­
der to attempt to counterbalance the threat of overzealous govern­
ment prosecution, that they create a risk of nonconviction for the 
sake of process rights,s1 that these process rights must inhere across 
the board in order to ensure both justice and the appearance of 
justice, and that norms are created that transcend the particulars of 
individual cases. Truth is just one of the values encompassed by 
justice. As for truth itself, we should remain wary of those who 
claim special access to it. 
B. The Values Animating Our "Profoundly Anti­
govemment"S2 Constitution 
Amar's scholarship on the criminal procedure amendments was 
published as a series of articles before becoming a book. The arti­
cle on the Fourth Amendment in particular,s3 and the Fifth Amend­
ment article to a lesser extent,s4 have elicited substantial critical 
commentary.ss Articles by Donald Dripps, Yale Kamisar, Tracey 
Maclin, and Carol Steiker take varied approaches to assessing 
51. See, e.g., Conner v. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 3 Binn. 38 (Pa. 1810) ("The 
suggestion that the party might escape is not of the least importance; it might be made in any 
case, and thus turned into an instrument of the grossest oppression. The Constitution prefers 
the escape of ten culprits, to the adoption of a practice which might lead to the imprisonment 
of one innocent man." Therefore, the warrant must be based on probable cause and oath or 
affirmation.). 
52. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 
349, 353 (1974). 
53. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 757 
(1994). 
54. Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self 
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857 (1995). 
55. See supra note 5 (listing articles). Amar's article on the Sixth Amendment, Akhil 
Reed Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEo. L.J. 641 (1996), was pub· 
lished shortly before this book's publication. I therefore suspect the reactions to the Sixth 
Amendment work will come in the form of book reviews rather than responses to the article. 
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Amar's work. Each is must reading for those who wish to evaluate 
Amar's approach to criminal procedure - including his historical 
analysis, his assessment of the development and state of current 
doctrine, his political and policy choices, his jurisprudence, and his 
methodology. Despite their differing approaches, the articles sound 
one common theme: that a great, and perhaps fatal, weakness in 
Amar's analysis is its failure to confront the fact that the criminal 
procedure amendments are meant to control governmental abuse 
and overreaching. , 
As I have indicated, I share this view. In his focus on innocence, 
Amar reads a host of precious values out of the Constitution. Many 
of these values serve to address the inequality of power between 
the government and the individual and the need to curtail abuse of 
that power. Amar is well aware of the governmental oppression 
that shaped the Constitution. In noncriminal contexts, as I will dis­
cuss below, governmental accountability is one of Amar's highest 
values. But in the criminal context, he finds it too easily trumped 
by another value: getting the bad guys. 
Amar rests his conclusion that law enforcement interests trump 
concerns for governmental abuse on the following reasoning. First, 
he assumes that the interests of the prosecution and the defendant 
are on par,56 an assumption that fails to confront the difference be­
tween the rights of the defendant, which are constitutionally en­
shrined, and the interests of the prosecution, which are not. 
Second, he unfairly weights the interest in prosecution by assuming 
that it is congruent with the interests of society, or "the people."57 
In doing so, Amar makes some peculiar assumptions about who 
"the people" are and how the people's trust and confidence should 
be earned. He assumes that "the people" is an entity completely 
separate from those accused of crime. Indeed, he seems to assume 
that "the people" gain when all the evidence comes out and when 
the guilty are put behind bars. He says, for example: "[w]hen the 
murderer's bloody knife is introduced, it is not only the government 
that profits; the people also profit when those who truly do commit 
crimes . . .  are . . .  convicted" (p. 26). But the presumption of inno­
cence, evidentiary protections, the concern for judicial integrity, 
and the control of governmental misconduct are all societal inter­
ests. Except for those as sure as Amar that they can identify the 
bad guys and that the bad guys are not us, these protections them-
56. See, e,g., p. 25 ("[W]e must remember that integrity and fairness are also threatened 
by excluding evidence that will help the justice system to reach a true verdict."). 
57. He adds the "rights" of victims to this side of the equation as well. See, e.g., p. 26 
("When rapists, burglars, and murderers are convicted, are not the people often more 'secure 
in their persons, houses, papers and effects?'"). 
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selves increase societal trust and confidence in the fair and even­
handed administration of the criminal justice system.58 
Amar's focus on innocence and what he calls truth-seeking im­
pedes recognition of many of these values. Evidentiary rules ex­
clude substantial amounts of evidence that are "true" and 
"accurate" in some sense of the words, but which are inflammatory, 
prejudicial, irrelevant, or redundant.59 Exclusion often serves val­
ues other than truth and accuracy. This is particularly true of 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rules, which, as Seidman says, 
pose the pure case for the efficacy of truth-denying rules.6° But it is 
also true of the dignitary concerns underlying the right against self­
incrimination61 and the assurance of fair trials for all defendants 
contained in the Sixth Amendment.62 Respect for the autonomy 
and dignity of the accused, the assurance of fair and evenhanded 
processes, concern for the integrity and accountability of the institu­
tions that administer criminal procedures - these are all truth-disa­
bling values at times. They impede, and are intended to impede, 
the government from doing all it can to put the guilty behind bars, 
at least when the government attempts to do so in derogation of 
other values. 
Amar would not be particularly disturbed by my objection. In­
deed, his whole point is that the values that impede truth-seeking 
are the wrong values, precisely because they impede truth-seeking. 
Unfortunately, even apart from the questionable and controversial 
historical and doctrinal support he garners for his argument and 
even apart from his failure to account for the vast changes in society 
in general and police practices in particular since the time of the 
framers, and even apart from the violence his proposals would do to 
dignity, autonomy, and evenhanded process, Amar's proposals 
should also be faulted because they will not achieve much of what 
he himself wants to achieve. Let us assess his proposals in light of 
58. As I have observed elsewhere, the legitimacy of the jury system, historically, de­
pended in large part on the good opinion of those whose cases it adjudicated. If the jury 
system maintained the appearance of justice in the eyes of the accused, it was more likely 
that the co=unity would accept its decisions as just. See Bandes, supra note 3, at 1046; see 
also Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 
545, 552 (1975). 
59. See U.S. v. Quasar, 671 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1982) (unfair prejudice may be present when 
infia=atory or otherwise shocking physical evidence or photographs are offered); see also 
U.S. v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1981). 
60. See Seidman, supra note 36, at 449. 
61. See Murphy v. Waterfront Co=., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (stating that privilege re­
flects many of our fundamental values and noble aspirations, including our desire to protect 
against statements elicited by inhumane treatment, our sense of fair play and our respect for 
the inviolability of the human personality and each individual's right to lead a private life). 
62. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968) (stating that the right to a jury trial 
is essential for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are provided 
for all defendants). 
May 1998] "We the People" 1393 
the dignity and judicial integrity values to which he assigns a low 
priority, as well as in light of the equality value he holds dear. 
1. Dignity 
Amar's proposals denigrate dignity in both expected and unex­
pected ways. Predictably, they are based on a lack of concern for 
the dignity of the "guilty." But in addition, they would promote 
widespread assaults on the dignity of society at large. 
Assuming for the moment that the innocent can be sorted neatly 
from the guilty, one deeply troubling aspect of Amar's elevation of 
innocence is its corollary: that the guilty are not entitled to protec­
tion. In my view, every human being is entitled to some dignity.63 
Even someone who has murdered in cold blood is entitled to a law­
yer at his trial to ensure fair process, a warrant before his home is 
searched to ensure reason for the intrusion, warnings before he de­
cides whether to confess to ensure free will and lack of coercion, 
and, at bottom, the recognition that he is still a part of the human 
community. Amar, as I understand it, simply disagrees with the 
proposition that the guilty are entitled to dignity by virtue of their 
humanity.64 At that level of disagreement, the Constitution and the 
Federalist Papers can advance the conversation only so far. 
Ironically, Amar's proposals would also damage the dignity of 
those he seeks to protect. Amar briefly acknowledges that his rea­
sonableness regime brings the danger of "too much arbitrariness 
and ad hoc-ery, unbounded by public, visible rules . . .  " (p. 38). His 
solution to the problem is that "a broader search is sometimes bet­
ter - fairer, more regular, more constitutionally reasonable . .  �" 
(p. 38). This is precisely the reasoning behind the ever-growing cat­
egory of special needs searches, extending governmental invasions 
of privacy to high school athletes, customs employees, railroad em­
ployees, 65 members of the President's cabinet66 and others not usu-
63. See Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. 
RE.v. 361, 412 (1996). 
64. Amar does recognize that forcible pumping of a suspect's stomach "without sufficient 
justification is horribly wrong." P. 251 n.43. Of course, the "sufficient justification" escape 
hatch raises questions about what Amar would consider adequate justification for forcible 
stomach pumping. Apparently, he advocates an ad hoc reasonableness inquiry in these cases, 
too. He would allow judges to weigh the invasiveness or humiliation of the examination or 
act against the gravity of the charged offense and the importance of the evidence to the 
prosecution's case. P. 83. Under such criteria, it seems likely that Professor Maclin is correct 
that the Rochin holding itself might not survive. See Maclin, supra note 5, at 52-53 (discuss­
ing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)). 
65. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National Treas­
ury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
66. See ROBERT REICH, LocKED IN THE CABINET 46 (1997) for an amusing description of 
the urine test administered to the Secretary of Labor. 
1394 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:1376 
ally considered part of the "criminal class,"67 without the 
requirement for individualized suspicion or a warrant. Amar would 
like to extend this reasoning beyond special needs cases, to cases in 
which criminal activity is suspected.68 He suggests that if such 
searches land disproportionately on certain groups, such as poor 
persons or persons of color, the government may claim that such 
groups are also disproportionate beneficiaries of the scheme, be­
cause the search is designed to reduce their risk of victimization. 69 
Thus, Amar advocates widening the net that will enmesh both inno­
cent and guilty. In evaluating Amar's proposals, we should recall 
Professor Shwartz's warning that "the worth of a society will even­
tually be reckoned not in proportion to the number of criminals it 
crucifies, bums, hangs or imprisons, but rather by the degree of lib­
erty experienced by the great body of its citizenry."70 Most of all, 
we should recall the words of Justice Jackson, written three years 
·after he returned from prosecuting the Nuremberg defendants: 
[O]ne need only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people 
possessed of many admirable qualities but deprived of [Fourth 
Amendment] rights to know that the human personality deteriorates 
and dignity and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons and 
possessions are subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure 
by the police.71 
2. Abuse of Power 
Amar is derisive about the values of judicial integrity and fair­
ness, which he calls a "slogan [which] sits atop a pile of dubious 
assumptions and inferences" (p. 25). Amar discusses these values 
67. See Note, "Special Needs" and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised to Swal­
low the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 529, 541-42 and nn.96-100 
(noting that lower courts have permitted suspicionless drug testing of emergency medical 
technicians, Federal Bureau of Prisons employees, certain Department of Education employ­
ees, Detroit police officers, and airline industry employees in safety-sensitive positions). 
Scott Sundby makes an insightful point in this regard. He argues that the very category of 
special needs searches is a shift from the usual presumption of innocence: it permits govern­
ment "to treat citizen as rule-breaker even in the absence of a fair probability that the citizen 
is not obeying the law." Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"'s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or 
Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 1751, 1799 {1994). 
68. P. 32 (calling the present regime "upside down."). Special needs searches have al­
ready been extended to some criminal investigations. See Michigan Dept. of State Police v. 
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 {1990) (permitting sobriety checkpoints). 
69. This reasoning was properly rejected in Pratt v. Chicago Hous. A11th., 848 F. Supp. 792 
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding the CHA housing sweeps violative of the Fourth Amendment). If a 
group desires to be searched, each member of the group is free to consent to a search. It is 
only the powerless, however, who have to choose between rampant crime and the wholesale 
waiver of constitutional rights. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 {1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect 
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent."). 
70. Schwartz, supra note 27, at 157, 158. 
71. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 {1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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and their impact on the exclusionary rule in a section entitled 
"Modern Moves" (pp. 25-31). The discussion is revealing both for 
what it says and for what it leaves unexamined. Amar discusses 
judicial integrity and fairness solely in the context of the exclusion­
ary rule, and thus he dismisses them in part because other Ameri­
can civil courts and criminal courts in other countries do not use the 
rule but do not lack integrity (pp. 25-31). But judicial integrity and 
fairness are not just "slogans" or "moves" to defend the exclusion­
ary rule; they are both important values in their own right, and as­
pects of a larger concern animating the Constitution: concern 
about lawless and abusive governmental tactics. 
Amar treats judicial integrity as a purely symbolic concern -
and one we can no longer afford to honor. He treats it as if it exists 
in a vacuum, unconnected to police abuse. I will discuss Amar's 
consistent practice of isolating and atomizing governmental conduct 
in more detail in the next section. Here is one excellent example of 
how it works: Amar can dismiss the need for exclusion of tainted 
evidence because he focuses solely on the ultimate product of the 
trial, which he views as the verdict. He fails to focus on the entire 
chain of governmental conduct and misconduct at issue.72 Then he 
defines his task as determining which is more harmful to the accept­
ability of the verdict, the use of tainted evidence at trial or the fail­
ure to convict one whom the people know to be guilty. But 
evidence does not spring fully formed into the courtroom. It was 
obtained through police misconduct on the street, and often makes 
its way to court through additional police misconduct as well as the 
misconduct of other governmental agents. Police sometimes coerce 
confessions, make wrongful searches, write false police reports, or 
fail to turn over exculpatory evidence, and then lie, both out of 
court and in court, about having done so.73 Such police conduct is 
repugnant regardless of whether it affects the innocent or the guilty. 
The court's use of evidence· obtained through police misconduct 
compromises the fairness and integrity of the trial. The judicial use 
of tainted evidence not only fails to condemn governmental lawless­
ness but also encourages it to continue, by sending the clear 
message that the evidence is welcome and will increase the chances 
of conviction. 
Why police misconduct is not repugnant in its own right, even 
when it is directed at the guilty, is an issue Amar never confronts 
directly. For example, he says: 
72. Kamisar makes this point powerfully in his critique of Amar and Lettow's proposal to 
admit the fruits of compelled statements. See Kamisar, supra note 5, at 960-64; see also Amar 
& Lettow, supra note 54. 
73. See Bandes, supra note 23, at 514-15 & nn.73-76. 
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Once we realize, as did the Founders, that we must provide deterrent 
remedies for innocent citizens, we can put an analytically proper rem­
edy in place, and exclusion is no longer necessary to deter. And, not 
coincidentally, our proper remedial scheme will be right side up, mak­
ing innocent citizens whole and denying guilty defendants windfalls. 
[p. 138] 
In other words, there is simply no need to deter police from illegally 
searching or seizing the guilty - if the guilty avoid subjection to 
such illegal police conduct as a byproduct of the protection of the 
innocent, then they receive a windfall. 
Nor does Amar explain why police misconduct should be laun­
dered by placing it in the hands of court personnel. He elides the 
fact that the very use of tainted evidence has serious consequences 
that are both symbolic and pragmatic. It threatens both the equita­
ble stance of the court and the appearance of justice, thus compro­
mising the court's authority to pass judgment on the lawless. As the 
Supreme Court observed, "The criminal goes free, if he must, but it 
is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government 
more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its 
disregard for the charter of its own existence."74 As Justice Holmes 
similarly observed in his famous dissent in Olmstead, "[N]o distinc­
tion can be taken between the Government as prosecutor and the 
Government as judge. If the existing code does not permit district 
attorneys to have a hand in such dirty business it does not permit 
the judge to allow such iniquities to succeed. "75 
But this concern is not merely symbolic. The refusal to condone 
police misconduct provides a judicial check on the continuation of 
the unconstitutional behavior.76 The judicial use of wrongly ob­
tained evidence, conversely, has the real world effect of encourag­
ing the police to continue breaking the law, because it gives them 
every incentive to do so.77 Even in Amar's universe of values, this 
is a highly problematic result, because such lawbreaking will not be 
confined to the guilty. But in addition, Amar's willingness to con­
done a judicial system comfortable with the use of illegal evidence 
helps explain his dismissive attitude toward "fairness." He sees it as 
a process value which is important only when it affects the innocent. 
His approach is firmly fixed on the bottom line - the reliability of 
the conviction, the search, the confession, and little concerned with 
74. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961); see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 
222-24 (1960). 
75. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
76. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Offi­
cials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 247, 282 
(1988). 
77. See infra text accompanying notes 150-172. 
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the way in which the conviction, the contraband, or the confession 
is obtained. 
The same bottom-line approach characterizes his Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment analysis. His overriding concern about confessions is 
with their reliability, and the means by which they are obtained 
seem to concern him most when they impinge on reliability. His 
concern about the right to counsel is with ensuring vindication of 
the innocent, and his argument for the right contains no theoretical 
support for the notion that all accused persons are entitled to coun­
sel. It would have been interesting to see a more nuanced treat­
ment of some of the attorney misconduct issues that often arise. 
For example, it is unlikely that Amar would object to improper 
closing arguments, or perhaps even shoddy and unprepared coun­
sel, where there was sufficient independent evidence of guilt. He 
describes the importance of a public trial in terms of factfinding, in 
terms of normative judgment toward the accused, and in terms of 
the education of jurors. But he barely mentions its importance in 
terms of safeguarding the fairness of the process and in preserving 
the appearance of justice (p. 122). 
The right Amar recognizes is, simply put, the right not to be 
wrongly convicted. Safeguards governing the conduct of police in­
vestigative techniques or the conduct of trial carry little weight un­
less they can be shown to have affected this ultimate right. The 
argument is, taken to its logical conclusion, an efficiency argument 
- one that devalues process and all that process protects, and asks 
only whether the correct result was achieved.1s 
Amar's singular focus on the ultimate right is exemplified by his 
high regard for the inevitable discovery and independent source 
doctrines, to which he complains that courts have given "too little 
rein."79 These doctrines are premised on the assumption that the 
78. Although Amar says he breaks with Judge Posner's "crude cost-benefit analysis" (p. 
35 and n.168), he does not explain how his theories stop short of Judge Posner's efficiency 
model, see, e.g., Hessel v. O'Heam, 977 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1992). Indeed, in his analysis of 
how a remedy would work in the speedy trial context, Amar argues that a guilty person who 
was wrongly incarcerated pretrial but who would eventually be incarcerated posttrial de­
serves no remedy, because his detention "does not appear to have caused any incremental 
deprivation of liberty." P. 111 (referring to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the 
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)). This reasoning recalls one of the cruder 
examples of Judge Posner's application of economic principles to constitutional values: his 
argument that the victim in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 298 
(7th Cir. 1987), had no right violated, as he "would probably have been no better off if the 
negligent caseworker had never intervened; he would simply have been beaten into a vegeta­
tive state by his father that much earlier." Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1225 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., concurring). See also Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A 
Critique, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2271, 2290 (1990). 
79. P. 156 (arguing for expansion of the inevitable discovery doctrine in the Fourth 
Amendment context). See also p. 60-61 (arguing that in the Fifth Amendment context, law 
should establish an irrebuttable presumption that the truth and the fruits of compelled testi­
mony would have come to light anyway). 
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police should be put in the position they would have been in had 
they not violated the Constitution, as it is more important to solve 
crimes than to create disincentives for police misconduct.80 Would 
Amar's theories not validate a confirmatory search,81 for example, 
on the theory that the police could have obtained a warrant, and 
therefore should not be penalized for conducting a warrantless 
search in order to save the time it would take to go downtown? 
Would they not validate knowing and repeated improper closing 
arguments by a prosecutor, so long as the evidence against the de­
fendant was overwhelming in each case? Would they not validate 
threats of violence calculated to elicit a confession, if independent 
reliable evidence of the defendant's guilt existed? Do they not 
adopt Justice Powell's position in Kimme/an v. Morrison, 82 that the 
failure to object to illegally seized but reliable evidence does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel? If not, Amar has not 
explained why not. 
3. Equality 
Amar's tendency to downplay or ignore the concern with police 
misconduct leads to many of his most troubling, and normatively 
unattractive, "big ideas."83 Most troubling of all, it directly inter­
feres with one of his dearly held goals - to promote equality of 
treatment. 
Amar's proposal to replace the requirements for warrants and 
probable cause with a reasonableness regime is a case in point. 
Amar's use of textualism takes him to a very odd place. He reasons 
that the colonists feared judges above all, and that therefore they 
80. Cf. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 {1988) (adopting the independent 
source doctrine, based on the rationale that while government should not profit from its 
illegal activity, neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would otherwise have 
occupied); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441-44 (1984) (adopting the inevitable discovery 
doctrine, based on the rationale that police should not be put in a worse position than they 
would have occupied absent their unlawful conduct); Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 
YALE L.J. 906 (1986) (arguing that the deterrence rationale requires that government illegal· 
ity should place government in worse position than it would otherwise have occupied). In· 
deed, as Professor Kamisar points out, Amar's and Lettow's Fifth Amendment argument to 
admit all physical fruits of coerced confessions would actually put the police in a better posi· 
tion than they would have been in, absent their misconduct, since it would admit the fruits 
regardless of whether they would have been discovered in any event. See Kamisar, supra 
note 5, at 1004. 
81. A confirmatory search is a warrantless search conducted by police in order to deter· 
mine whether it is worth the trouble to get the requisite warrant. See Murray, 487 U.S. at 547 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing confirmatory searches). Amar comes close to approving 
confirmatory searches. P. 26. 
82. 477 U.S. 365, 396 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring). 
83. See p. 65 ("What's the Big Idea?"); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Fifty-Seventh 
Cleveland-Marshall Lecture: The Bill of Rights and Our Posterity, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 573, 
585 (1994) (discussing the importance of finding "the big idea," or core concept, underlying 
constitutional provisions). 
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did not mean to elevate the judicial warrant requirement (pp. 10-
17). Rather, they meant to give power to juries (pp. 10-17). Amar 
has been criticized for his reading of history and for his on-again, 
off-again textualism.84 But even apart from these grave problems 
with his analysis, he makes some outrageous leaps. He reasons that 
because the warrant requirement was not very important to the 
framers, neither was the probable cause requirement that is nested 
in the same clause. Therefore, the linchpin of the Fourth Amend­
ment must be the other clause - reasonableness. He accuses sup­
porters of probable cause of "doubly flawed logic," but this is 
precisely the problem with his own reasoning. He uses his misread­
ing of the historical importance of the warrant clause to "drag[ ] 
along its yoked mate, the probable cause requirement"85 - or drag 
them both down together, to be precise. 
Once Amar has disposed of the Warrant Clause and the prob­
able cause requirement,86 he argues that a reasonableness regime 
would accomplish a number of goals. He argues that it would allow 
a more calibrated notion of what searches ought to be permitted. 
For example, more serious crimes might require less reason for in­
trusion (p. 33). A reasonableness regime would permit the interests 
of victims to be placed in the balance (pp. 37-38). It also would 
allow the jury to do much of the balancing, because "the jury is 
perfectly placed to decide, in any given situation, whom it fears 
more, the cops or the robbers."87 On top of all that, a reasonable­
ness regime would allow us to deal more openly and honestly with 
questions of race and gender discrimination (p. 38). 
Amar is undoubtedly correct that a reasonableness regime 
would encourage more of a sliding scale, more balancing, more con­
cern for victims, and more room to factor in fear of robbers, or 
respect for cops. But all this is a good thing only for someone who 
84. See Maclin, supra note 5, at 4-25; Steiker, supra note 5, at 826-30. 
85. P. 18. Tracey Maclin's article contains an excellent and extended rebuttal to Amar's 
historical arguments against the importance of the warrant clause. See Maclin, supra note 5, 
at 10-25; see also Hearing, supra note 26, at 133-38 (statement of Prof. Thomas Y. Davies) 
(refuting Amar's contention that reasonableness was the Framers' core concern). 
86. Amar never really explains how he can read them both nearly out of the Fourth 
Amendment while still taking the text seriously. He explains that the "warrant" and "prob­
able cause" language cannot mean what some scholars claim, because the language does not 
say, and cannot mean, that warrants and probable cause are required in all cases. See p. 152. 
See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 53, 74-75 (1996). But this is a straw argument. He cites no one who 
argues that the presumption in favor of warrants should be irrebuttable. See Maclin, supra 
note 5, at 5-8. In any case, Amar does not explain the prominence of the language in the text 
of the Fourth Amendment, nor does he explain the "puzzling persistence of the warrant 
requirement." Steiker, supra note 5, at 847. 
87. P. 44. But see Steiker, supra note 5, at 850 ("[J]uries 'vill almost always fear the 
robbers more than the cops, but this fact does not necessarily mean that everything the cops 
do is 'reasonable."'). 
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believes that the police can be trusted to make these determinations 
without meaningful prior guidelines. The puzzling question is why 
someone with Amar's knowledge of and sensitivity toward the Civil 
Rights era and its legacy would believe such a thing. 
Amar cites Terry v. Ohio88 to support his claim that his pro­
posed reasonableness analysis will advance the values of equality. 
He says it is "probably no coincidence" that Terry, which carved out 
exceptions to the probable cause and warrant requirements, con­
tained "one of the most open discussions of race to date" (p. 37). 
But in fact, Terry is both a cause and a prime illustration of the 
damage that reasonableness analysis has done to equality values in 
the Fourth Amendment context. Though Terry has been salutary to 
the extent it has brought street level practices \vithin the reach of 
the Fourth Amendment, it has been a disaster to the extent its rea­
sonableness analysis has begun doing exactly what Amar advocates: 
swallowing up the Warrant Clause. Thanks to Terry and its prog­
eny, we need not speculate about the effects of a reasonableness 
regime. We can simply observe that nearly every time the Terry 
balancing methodology has been employed, the needs of law en­
forcement have outweighed the rights of defendants.89 We can also 
note that the street level practices Terry sought to regulate through 
this balancing regime are rife with massive, race-based harassment 
and abuse.90 And when the Court has acknowledged racial con­
cerns in this context, it has found pretextual stops91 or drug courier 
profiles92 to be reasonable, without regard to race. Some lower 
courts have found race to be a reasonable profiling factor in author­
izing a Terry stop under some circumstances.93 
Many of the most flagrantly discriminatory abuses of police 
power take place in the context of traffic stops. These include per­
sistent and notorious patterns of stopping disproportionate num­
bers of black motorists fo! minor . violc:itions - for example, a 
88. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
89. See Maryland v. Wtlson, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 
646, 660-64 (1995); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 618-33 (1989); 
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); Pennsylvania 
v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-12 (1977); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-50 (1972). 
90. See Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 425, 428-32 
(1997); Elizabeth A. Gaynes, The Urban Criminal Justice System: Where Young + Black + 
Male = Probable Cause, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 621, 625 (1993). 
91. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996). 
92. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); see also Michael Higgins, Looking 
the Part, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1997, at 48, 50 (describing airport stops apparently based solely on 
race or alienage, such as stopping passengers \vith Arabic-sounding surnames). 
93. See United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1992). But see City of St. Paul v. 
Uber, 450 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that racial incongruity is not a proper 
basis for a Terry stop). See also Sklansky, supra note 28, at 317 (arguing that although Terry 
itself made explicit its concern with race, that "theme has largely disappeared from Fourth 
Amendment law"). 
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burned-out tail light or a failure to signal a lane change - and then 
finding various pretexts to search their cars or persons for drugs.94 
The Court has declined every opportunity to regulate this miscon­
duct. It has given police wide latitude to make warrantless custo­
dial arrests, refusing to require any local rulemaking on the subject 
of what sorts of crimes may lead to custodial arrests.95 It has re­
fused to inquire into whether police conduct was pretextual - that 
is, whether a reasonable officer would have made an arrest based 
on the conduct at issue.96 It has refused to require an officer who 
has completed a Terry stop to inform the suspect that he is free not 
to answer subsequent questions unrelated to the purpose of the 
stop.97 It consistently has reaffirmed that its only concern is 
whether the officer had the authority to make the arrest or search.98 
In other words, was the motorist guilty of driving with a burned out 
taillight, or was he not? Was he driving with an expired license or 
not? If he was not factually innocent of the crime charged, the 
Court finds no cause to complain about further search.99 
We also should note that if juries are asked whom they fear 
more, the cops or the robbers, evidence shows that race will likely 
figure - to the detriment of minorities - in their decisions about 
whom to fear and whom to value.10° For example, the Baldus stud­
ies have demonstrated that race plays a significant role in determin­
ing which defendants are sentenced to die.101 There is something 
chilling about Amar's frequent use of the term "common sense."1°2 
Experience shows that our folk wisdom about who is "just plain 
folks" often acts to exclude those who are not "like us."103 
Of course, these are not results that Amar desires - quite the 
opposite. But his regime will not protect minorities. His structure 
simply does not account for police behavior in the real world. Ex-
94. See Bast, supra note 28; David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When 
Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 679-81 (1994); Sheri Lynn 
Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE LJ. 214, 225-30 (1983). 
95. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224-37 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 
U.S. 260, 263-66 (1973). 
96. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772-74. 
97. See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996). 
98. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
99. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236. The Court also has raised 
substantial hurdles to claims of racially discriminatory enforcement. See United States v. 
Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996). 
100. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL 
AND EMPIRICAL .ANALYSIS 148-49 (1990). 
101. See id.; cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 n.7 (1987) (assuining the validity of 
the Baldus study conclusions); Bandes, supra note 63, at 398 n.187. 
102. See p. 32 (discussing co=on sense (tort) reasonableness). 
103. See Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L. REv. 373, 374-75 (1992) (describing 
the dangers of judging competency and sanity based on "ordinary co=on sense"). 
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perience shows again and again that preclearance,104 limits on dis­
cretion,  and neutral third parties are essential when the 
opportunities for abuse and discrimination are as rampant as they 
are on the street. It is true that these safeguards will also act to 
protect the bad guys - there is no way around it. 
II. AMA.R'S ATOMISTIC CONSTITUTION 
[T]he Constitution draws its life from postulates that limit and control 
lawless governments, not postulates that limit and control citizens in 
their efforts to vindicate constitutional rights.105 
I have long admired Amar's federal courts scholarship. Per­
haps, in retrospect, it was an instance of reading what I wanted to 
into another's scholarship, but I do not think so. Certain values 
emanate from Amar's work on government liability: the constitu­
tional mandate for full remediation; the inherent value of constitu­
tional rights - independent of their private law analogues and 
independent of the will of the majority; the flexible and evolving 
nature of constitutional norms; the overriding importance of gov­
ernmental accountability; and the systemic nature of much govern­
mental misconduct, and therefore the need for systemic remedies to 
combat it.106 I also have admired Amar's determination to read the 
Constitution as a whole and to identify its overarching values.107 
In Amar's treatment of the criminal procedure amendments, 
these values are lost, or at least very hard to find. Here he seems 
blinded to the deep structure of the substantive and remedial model 
he champions elsewhere. The most salient characteristic of his 
analysis in this area is its tendency toward atomization - of gov­
ernmental conduct, of the interests of defendants, of remedial op­
tions, and ultimately, of the Constitution itself - as Amar's 
analysis in this area stands in isolation from even his own approach 
toward the remainder of the Constitution. In this section, I will ex­
amine the ways in which Amar's ideas about criminal procedure 
diverge from the values of connectedness, accountability, full 
remediation, the inherent value of rights, and an evolving Constitu­
tion. I divide the analysis into two sections. The first section argues 
104. Amar allows that "[p]reclearance might also help firm up the record of what facts 
the government had before the intrusion, thereby preventing officials from dreaming up post 
hoc rationalizations" and that at times prior approval from a "more neutral and detached 
decision maker" might be needed to pass constitutional muster. Pp. 38-39. But his baffling 
proposal is that the decision to require preclearance should be "pragmatic, contingent, and 
subject to easy revision" and should be based on whether preclearance is reasonable under 
the particular circumstances. Pp. 38-39. He offers no further details of who would make 
these decisions, at what point in the proceedings, and based on what actual criteria. 
105. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1485 (1987). 
106. See id.; Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 7. 
107. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 7, at 1131 (calling for a holistic interpretation of the Bill 
of Rights and the Constitution). 
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that Amar views the constitutional rights of the accused - or at 
least, those he would view as justly accused - as having no inher­
ent value, but instead as worthy of protection only to the extent 
they jibe with majoritarian preferences. The second section exam­
ines his atomistic view of the wrongful conduct these amendments 
seek to regulate and the remedies that should flow from their 
violation. 
A. What is the Worth of Unpopular Rights? 
Amar has often spoken with admiration of the principles em­
bodied in the cases of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the 
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics108 and Ex Parte Young.109 For example, in 
First Principles, Amar advocates "a Section 1983/Ex Parte Young/ 
Bivens model featuring before-the-fact prevention via injunctions 
and after-the-fact compensation and deterrence via damages" (p. 
115). Amar explained that the major achievement of Bivens and 
Young was their recognition of the self-executing nature of the 
Constitution, and therefore of the Court's power to infer a damage 
action directly under the Constitution.110 He lamented the fact that 
the promise of Bivens was only partially fulfilled, as it permitted 
only a suit against individual, possibly judgment-proof, officers and 
not against the governmental entity, though "a governmental wrong 
. . .  seems naturally to call for governmental liability."111 
Why was it so important for Bivens and Young to recognize the 
self-executing nature of constitutional rights, and what precisely is it 
that these cases recognized? Prior to Bivens, the only damage rem­
edy generally provided for unconstitutional searches was a private 
trespass suit against the agent.112 The other possible source of a 
damage suit was a statute, though it is well known that there was no 
federal statutory cause of action available to Webster Bivens.113 
The importance of Bivens and Young was twofold. It flowed from 
their recognition that, first, the constitutional right itself has inher­
ent value, apart from its incidental congruence with common law or 
private law protections (pp. 106-07), and second, the constitutional 
right has value apart from the willingness of an elected legislature 
108. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Amar cites Bivens 14 times in the First Principles book alone. 
See pp. 29, 41, 110-11, 115, 139, 180 n.4, 193 n.139, 194 n.151, 199 n.209, 209, 210, 236 n.78, 237 
n.86, 239 n.111, 252 n.48. 
109. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
110. See Amar, supra note 105, at 1507-08. 
111. Id. at 1507-08. 
112. See id. at 1506-07. 
113. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("For people in Bivens' 
shoes, it is damages or nothing."). 
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to grant it statutory protection.114 The problem with the cases, as 
both Amar and I have pointed out, is that the recognition is incom­
plete - the Court is too tied to the private law model to create the 
enterprise liability that would provide full remediation and the 
most effective assurance of governmental accountability.11s 
In light of Amar's admiration for the Bivens principle, it is sur­
prising to find that his views of the criminal procedure protections 
paint a considerably less generous portrait of the worth of the un­
derlying rights and the need for full remediation. What is the worth 
of the rights of the accused? Oddly, Amar heaps a host of condi­
tions on the recognition of these rights. These conditions are di­
rectly antithetical to the ideals of Bivens. In fact, several of them 
are in conflict with the very notion of the Constitution as a 
countermajoritarian document that will safeguard rights despite the 
popular will. It seems that Amar will assign value to the criminal 
procedure rights only if at least one of the following conditions is 
met: 
(1) The right jibes with tort or property notions. 
(2) The legislature passes a statute recognizing the right. 
(3) A jury is willing to compensate the loss of the right. 
( 4) The remedy for the right is spelled out in the Con$titution. 
1. The Right Jibes with Tort or Property Notions 
Amar's reliance on the common law antecedents of criminal 
procedure is particularly surprising. He uses the Constitution's 
"background common law principles" both to define the rights in­
volved and to define the proper remedies - specifically, to argue 
against the exclusionary rule. As to the definition of the right, for 
example, he argues that tort law, because it is keyed to the invasion 
of the search itself, "focuses precisely on the scope of the [Fourth 
Amendment] violation" (p. 158) in a way that our current regime, 
which focuses on exclusion and deterrence, does not. He argues 
that the language protecting security in " 'persons, houses, papers, 
and effects' should remind us of the background common law prin­
ciples . . .  [of] the law of tort."116 He criticizes the exclusionary rule 
because it is based on no common law antecedents and because 
114. See Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. 
L. REv. 289, 293-320 (1995); see also Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The 
Constitlltion as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1532, 1540-43 (1972). 
115. P. 110. See Bandes, supra note 114, at 325-34. 
116. P. 20 (referring to the language of the Fourth Amendment). See also pp. 152-53 
(repeating the assertion that the Fourth Amendment conjures up tort law). 
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"tort law remedies were . . . clearly the ones presupposed by the 
Framers of the Fourth Amendment. "117 
Yet the central lesson of Bivens was precisely counter to these 
arguments. Bivens stated, most famously, that an abuse of power 
by a governmental agent is different and more serious than a similar 
abuse by a private person. It rests on the insight that there is a 
constitutionally significant difference between a trespass, battery, or 
false imprisonment by a private person and an illegal search or 
seizure by a government agent, and that both the scope of the right 
and the nature of the remedy need to reflect that difference.118 It 
observed that "[o]ur cases have long since rejected the notion that 
the Fourth Amendment proscribes only such conduct as would, if 
engaged in by private persons, be condemned by state law."119 Biv­
ens's achievement - its recognition of the self-executing Constitu­
tion - was made possible by its rejection of the notion of a suit 
against government as a tort-like proceeding between private par­
ties. Its limitation - its failure to recognize governmental liability 
- was a product of its vestigial loyalty to the private rights model. 
Amar attempts to finesse the inconvenient parts of the tort 
model - such as its inability to accommodate enterprise liability -
by arguing that it must be "supplemented," (p. 159) "translated," 
(p. 159) and "brought into the twenty-first century" (pp. 29-30). 
Conveniently for his thesis, he finds that the twenty-first century 
version of the framers' intent would accord precisely with his pro­
posals. The modem version would account for the vast changes in 
government, police practices, and race relations since colonial 
times120 by upgrading "the civil model rather than inventing out of 
whole cloth a criminal one" (p. 30). It would compensate the inno­
cent but not the guilty, it would replace the warrant and probable 
cause requirements with a regime of "common law (tort) reasona­
bleness"121 and it would permit class aggregation techniques, civil 
injunctions, a ten percent sentencing discount for defendants with 
valid Fourth Amendment claims, and enterprise liability, but not 
the exclusionary rule. Why? B ecause " [t]he modern-day 
117. P. 21. But see Hearing, supra note 26, at 133-38 (statement of Prof. Thomas Y. Da­
vies) (offering an interesting historical account of the late appearance of the exclusionary 
rule). 
118. See Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, at 392. 
119. See Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, at 392. 
120. See Steik:er, supra note 5, at 830-44. Amar responds to Steiker's point that police are 
far more organized and dangerous than they were in the 1780s by suggesting that "we should 
further ask whether violent criminals are also more organized and dangerous." P. 197 n.190. 
121. Pp. 32-35. Amar suggests that tort concepts of reasonableness must be understood 
in the context of constitutional law. He illustrates with examples of how the protections of 
the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments should be read in conjunction with the Fourth 
Amendment. Pp. 35-40. But these illustrations fail to address a basic point - how the con­
stitutional concept differs from the tort concept as to the Fourth Amendment itself. 
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equivalent of a horse and buggy is a car, not an Andy Warhol 
poster."122 
Amar never deals with the evidence - both empirical and anec­
dotal - that tort remedies have been massively ineffective in cases 
against police officers. For multiple reasons, including lack of in­
centive to sue, lack of jury sympathy for defendants, state-law im­
munities, and the fact that police misconduct often consists of small, 
incremental violations rather than dramatic episodes, the likelihood 
of significant damage awards is extremely small.123 Moreover, even 
a longstanding series of large settlement awards, totalling tens of 
millions of dollars a year, has failed to cause cities like New York or 
Chicago to re-examine their policies on police brutality, or even to 
discipline the individual officers involved.124 
Amar advocates the use of minimum presumed damages in 
Fourth Amendment cases (p. 42). Ironically, the Court's current 
treatment of presumed damages is grounded in the tort law princi­
ples Amar espouses and gives direct evidence of the worth of the 
rights in a private law context. In Carey v. Piphus125 and Memphis 
Community School District v. Stachura, 126 the Court held that dam­
ages could be awarded based not on any inherent or presumed 
value or importance of constitutional rights, but only on the actual 
injury suffered, with possible consideration of punitive damages in 
the former case. The actual injury would be measured by . . .  tort 
concepts! If the plaintiff had not suffered a common law harm such 
as bodily injury, economic or property harm, or emotional distress, 
he could recover no more than one dollar in nominal damages. 
122. P. 30. Amar turns for support to Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS 
L. REv. 1165 (1993). P. 194 n.152. Yet Amar's version of fidelity theory as it applies to the 
Fourth Amendment seems far more limited than both Lessig's own version and Amar's ver­
sion when dealing with noncriminal constitutional protections. See, e.g., William Michael 
Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 
CoLUM. L. REv. 782 (1995) (arguing that fidelity theory is consistent with using the takings 
clause to create a new cause of action to advance environmental justice, a use of which Lessig 
explicitly approved); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 
1381-84 (1997) (generally approving Treanor's analysis as a proper application of fidelity the­
ory). Amar himself has argued that the Thirteenth Amendment can be used to create a cause 
of action against child abuse in a DeShaney-type situation, see Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel 
Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 
HAR.v. L. REv. 1359 (1992), and against hate speech. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the 
Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REv. 124 (1991). 
123. See Meltzer, supra note 76, at 272 & n.125, 284; see also Amsterdam, supra note 52, 
at 429-30. 
124. See Deborah Sontag & Dan Barry, Using Settlements to Gauge Police Abuse, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 17, 1997, at Al; Andrew Martin, Daley Backs Officers in Death of Honduran, 
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 5, 1998, § 2, at 1. 
125. 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978) (stating that only nominal damages are available for the 
violation of a constitutional right, absent proof of "actual injury). 
126. 477 U.S. 299, 310 (1986) (stating that no compensatory damages are available for the 
"abstract importance of constitutional rights"). 
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Such is the worth of the right when viewed against the background 
of state and common law.127 
2. The Legislature Passes a Statute Recognizing the Right 
Much of Amar's proposed regime, particularly in the Fourth 
Amendment context, depends on legislative enactment, as several 
commentators have noted.128 One such proposal is enterprise lia­
bility (p. 41). Amar makes, as he has elsewhere, a powerful case for 
the importance of enterprise liability in regulating the police. In 
addition, Amar wants legislatures to fashion rules delineating the 
search and seizure authority of governmental officials. Indeed, he 
announces that legislatures are obligated to do so (p. 43). He also 
believes that legislatures will be moved to do so when they see gov­
ernmental entities paying damage awards (p. 41). 
The problem is not with the content of the proposals them­
selves. The problem is that Amar presents them as a package -
enact these proposals and jettison the exclusionary rule. The pack­
age is not addressed merely to scholars. Not only has Amar written 
in favor of jettisoning the exclusionary rule, he has testified to that 
effect before Congress.129 It may be clear to his scholarly audience 
that he offers a package. It is unlikely to be clear to congressional 
foes of the exclusionary rule that Amar's opposition is conditioned 
on their responsibility, or that of their state counterparts, to enact 
broad-based remedies like enterprise liability, intrusive remedies 
like state-level rulemaking, and unorthodox remedies like a ten.­
percent sentence discount for defendants with valid Fourth Amend­
ment claims - substituting for the other ninety percent a structural 
remedy that will fl.ow to the benefit of law-abiding citizens. Amar 
often writes as if lawmakers of all three branches of government 
enact overarching plans - as if they decide to weaken one protec­
tion only when strengthening another. Is it not also possible that 
lawmakers hostile to criminal defendants will weaken protections 
across the board? 
The other part of the problem is that to assume any of these 
proposals will be adopted is, to borrow Amar's phrase from another 
context, "pure fantasy" (p. 157). Amar talks about the twentieth 
century's "woeful failure to nurture the civil model" (p. 30), but of 
course he cannot point to a historical period in which such a model 
was even partially adopted to regulate police, and he cannot explain 
why the current period - so hospitable to draconian crime preven-
127. See Bandes, supra note 114, at 331-32. 
128. See Maclin, supra note 5, at 59-65 (criticizing Amar's reliance on legislative action); 
Steiker, supra note 5, at 848-49 (questioning the use of legislative action in Fourth Amend­
ment damage awards). 
129. See supra note 6. 
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tion legislation - should be different. As others have pointed out, 
the history of statutory attempts to regulate police departments has 
amounted to a "wholesale 'legislative default' "  from the inception 
of professional policing until today.130 Mapp held the exclusionary 
rule applicable to the states only when they utterly abdicated their 
responsibility to adopt alternative means of police regulation, de­
spite ample warning that they must do so.131 Bivens itself is the 
paradigmatic case in which the Court had to act to protect Fourth 
Amendment rights because Congress had not done so. Bivens 
stands for the proposition, which Amar elsewhere holds dear, that 
every wrong deserves a remedy. The legislature will not act unless 
it perceives, at minimum, an ongoing pattern of violations.132 The 
exclusionary rule, on the other hand, is predicated on the duty of 
the courts to remedy violations in every case before them. 
Amar says that "proper methodology of constitutional criminal 
procedure does not blind itself to practical effects" (p. 154). Con­
sidering practical effects is never more important than when a 
highly respected scholar suggests real-world changes in criminal 
procedure to bodies with the power to change the law.133 
3. A Jury Is Willing to Compensate the Loss of the Right 
In his article "The Bill of Rights as a Constitution," Amar states 
that "the central role of the jury in the Fourth Amendment should 
remind us that the core rights of 'the people' were popular and pop­
ulist rights - rights which the popular body of the jury was well 
suited to vindicate."134 Although Amar also says that "the key role 
of the jury was to protect ordinary mdividuals against governmental 
overreaching,"135 apparently he is using the word "ordinary" to de­
scribe individuals who were seeking to vindicate popular, majority 
rights, as opposed to the countermajoritarian rights he argues were 
not a core concern until the time of the Fourteenth Amendment.136 
Even if we assume the correctness of Amar's colonial history, it 
tells us little about the role of the jury in our post-Fourteenth 
130. See Steiker, supra note 5, at 835 (citing Amsterdam, supra note 52, at 378-79). See 
also id. at 848-49. 
131. See Yale Kamisar, Remembering the "Old World" Of Criminal Procedure: A Reply 
to Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 537, 565 {1990) {recalling that during the 47-
year period between Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 384 {1914), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643 (1961), "none of the many states whose courts permitted the use of illegally ob­
tained evidence developed an effective alternative safeguard"); Maclin, supra note 5, at 60. 
132. See Meltzer, supra note 76, at 288-89. 
133. See id. at 288-89 (detailing obstacles to legislative enactment of remedies against 
police misconduct). 
134. Amar, supra note 7, at 1180. 
135. Id. at 1183. 
136. See id. at 1180. 
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Amendment, pluralistic society. Is Amar really arguing that the 
jury's role is to protect only popular majority rights against govern­
ment overreaching, and to allow unpopular minorities to fend for 
themselves? To unpack this claim would take far more space than I 
have here, but that argument raises serious questions about both 
the nature of the Bill of Rights and the nature of the Constitution 
itself, not to mention the relevance of changing conditions to consti­
tutional interpretation. As Carol Steiker points out, Amar de­
scribes the transformation of the F irst Amendment after 
Reconstruction from a protection for popular speech to a protec­
tion for unpopular speech. Why not bring the same recognition to 
the criminal procedure amendments?137 
Reluctantly I must conclude that Amar really does believe that 
in the criminal realm, the role of the jury is to vindicate "popular 
rights" - an oxymoron, in my opinion. There is ample evidence of 
this throughout the book, such as his assertion that "the jury is per­
fectly placed to decide, in any given situation, whom it fears more, 
the cops or the robbers" (p. 44), or his assertion that "[w]hen rapists 
are freed, the people are less secure in their houses and persons" (p. 
30). In the Fourth Amendment context, the dominant legal issue 
for the jury, under Amar's proposals, would be whether the police 
conduct was reasonable. The reasonableness calculus would permit 
the jury to balance, in each case, the importance of the law enforce­
ment interest, the severity of the crime, the interests of the victims, 
as well as whom the jury fears more. The jury would make these 
decisions in light of its common sense. 
· 
As I said earlier, much is chilling about this formulation. Let us 
consider Amar's plan in light of his desire to advance the principle 
of equality. He asserts, "[I]n a variety of search and seizure con­
texts, we must honestly address racially imbalanced effects and ask 
ourselves whether they are truly reasonable" (p. 37). As I have dis­
cussed elsewhere, juries are made up of human beings whose com­
mon sense often allows them to empathize most closely with those 
who are most like them. "As for people from backgrounds - eth­
nic, religious, racial, economic - unlike [their] own, however, there 
is a pervasive risk that [their] ability to empathize will be inhibited 
by ingrained, preconscious assumptions about them."138 Their no­
tions of common sense also may permit them to assume that their 
137. See Steiker, supra note 5, at 844-46. See also Amar, supra note 7, at 1150-52. 
138. Bandes, supra note 63, at 399. See also ROBERT L. KATZ, EMPATHY: ITS NATURE 
AND UsES 5-6 (1963); Michael Franz Basch, Empathetic Understanding: A Review of the 
Concept and Some Theoretical Considerations, 31 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC AssN. 101, 112 
(1983); Heinz Kohut, Introspection, Empathy, and Psychoanalysis, 7 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC 
AssN. 459, 463 {1959). 
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assumptions and prejudices are factually based.139 As Amar explic­
itly recognizes, jurors' fears may drive their decisions when criminal 
defendants are concerned. The Baldus studies demonstrated as 
much, and more - that these fears are often racially based.140 
Amar believes that the jury will sort out the innocent from the 
guilty and will despise only the guilty. Even apart from the simplis­
tic notion of guilt and innocence this belief bespeaks, it also reflects 
an amazing faith that all those "we" care about will be on the right 
side of the scales. 
4. The Remedy for the Right Is Spelled Out in the Constitution 
The most ironic deviation from Amar's Bivens paradigm is his 
argument against the exclusionary rule on the ground that "[t]he 
text of the Fourth Amendment says nothing about criminal exclu­
sion" (p. 107). As he puts it later: "This rule is, quite simply, not in 
our Constitution" (p. 150). This is the classic argument that proves 
too much. As Amar himself notes, the "only provision in the entire 
Constitution addressing the technical issue of remedies with any 
specificity" is the protection of habeas corpus (p. 106). Of course, 
none of the remedies he suggests in the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth 
Amendment contexts is in the Constitution - not structural injunc­
tions; or any kind of equitable relief; or the Bivens action, which has 
often been attacked on the same grounds;141 or even judicial review 
itself,142 much less a ten-percent sentencing discount for defendants 
with valid Fourth Amendment claims. I feel sure - given his prior 
scholarship - that Amar would not argue that the failure of the 
Bill of Rights to spell out specific remedies renders the first ten 
amendments merely precatory. 
But my complaint really is not about Amar's inconsistency in 
claiming textual support for his arguments touting some implied 
remedies and trashing others. It is about the fact that asking for 
explicit textual support for particular remedies is directly antitheti­
cal to the holding and spirit of Bivens. Apparently, Amar would 
like to defend his allegiance to Bivens on the ground that Bivens 
holds in favor of a damage remedy. But if this is all Bivens says, it 
139. See Angela P. Harris, The Jurispmdence of Victimhood, 1991 SuP. CT. REv. 77, 94-
95; Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 
1016, 1027-29 (1988); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reck­
oning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322-23 (1987); see also Perlin, supra 
note 103, at 397. 
140. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 101; see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 
n.7 (1987) (assuming arguendo the accuracy of the Baldus studies' statistical findings); John­
son, supra note 139, at 1019-21 (discussing what exactly Justice Powell accepted about the 
Baldus studies). 
141. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 35 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Bandes, 
supra note 114, at 312. 
142. See Bandes, supra note 114, at 312-14. 
May 1998] "We the People" 1411 
does not say very much. Its more important point - that the rem­
edy is not dependent on legislative enactment - is lost in Am.ar's 
analysis. As I have argued elsewhere, "requiring a clear statement 
of judicial . . .  power . . .  protects the political status quo from the 
possibility of judicial reform. It ratifies the choices of the powerful, 
and relegates the powerless to explicit legislative remedies they are 
unlikely to secure."143 If the worth of the right depends on what is 
spelled out in the Constitution, on legislation, on jurors' common 
sense, and on congruence with common law, the dollar permitted 
by Carey v. Piphus144 might be an optimistic assessment. 
B. Atomizing Constitutional Wrongdoing 
In this section, I argue that Amar's treatment of the criminal 
procedure amendments is flawed by his tendency to atomize the 
governmental misconduct at issue. I first discuss Am.ar's atomistic 
portrayal of the constitutional wrongs themselves. Specifically, I 
discuss the ways in which Amar disaggregates complex chains of 
governmental misconduct, portraying them as a series of discrete, 
individual acts connected by simple, mechanistic causal links. Sec­
ond, I argue that the atomistic view of wrongs leads to an atomistic 
view of the proper remedies. The view of wrongs as discrete rather 
than interconnected is consistent with narrow notions of what is 
preventable, with an emphasis on damage actions, and with a some­
what jaundiced attitude toward th� concept of the private attorney 
general. I examine each of these remedial notions. 
The tendency to atomize governmental conduct is common 
enough,145 but its appearance in Amar's jurisprudence is surprising 
and inconsistent. In Of Sovereignty and Federalism, Amar makes 
an eloquent case for enterprise liability. His "first principle" in 
those pages is the maxim that where there is a right, there should be 
a remedy.146 He explains that individual liability is often an inade­
quate remedy for government wrongdoing for a number of reasons, 
such as the fact that "[p ]ervasive and systematic illegality will not 
always be traceable to specific individuals who can be called to ac­
count" and the fact that "the governmental entity will often be in a 
far better position than any individual officer to restructure official 
conduct iii a way that avoids future violation of rights."147 Amar's 
strong position for enterprise liability, and the reasoning he uses to 
advance it, suggest to me not only that he places a high value on 
143. Id. at 314. 
144. 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1998). 
145. See Susan Bandes, Narrative Coherence and the Anecdotal Tum: Stories of Police 
Bmtality (manuscript on file with author). 
146. See Amar, supra note 105, at 1485-86. See also p. 41. 
147. Amar, supra note 105, at 1487-88. 
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government accountability, but also that he recognizes the complex 
ways in which individuals can act together to create systemic mis­
conduct and the importance of deterrence to systemic reform. 
On a particularized and literal level, Amar's proposals for re­
forming criminal procedure in First Principles are consistent with 
his proposals in the earlier article. Amar consistently argues for 
injunctive and damage actions, coupled with enterprise liability. 
But here again the generous and protective spirit that animates the 
earlier work is transformed when the criminally accused are the 
beneficiaries. The larger insight of enterprise liability - that com­
pensating each individual may not constitute full remediation when 
government is the wrongdoer - is lost. 
1. Atomizing Governmental Wrongs 
Amar defines governmental wrongs atomistically and narrowly. 
Amar's earlier insights about the ways in which pervasive and sys­
temic illegality occur are hard to find in this arena. Here, instead, 
he is much more likely to view systemic conduct as a series of iso­
lated instances. To begin, he views police conduct as a series of 
discrete, unconnected acts as opposed to part of a causal chain. He 
finds the search of the white powder in Jacobsen148 or the dog sniff 
in Place, 149 for example, to be reasonable because he is willing to 
see them as discrete acts, with no connection to the intrusive 
searches and seizures that often follow at their heels.150 He argues 
that physical fruits of compelled confessions ought to be admissible, 
because he makes little connection between the illegal interrogation 
and the later discovery of its fruits. As Kamisar says, Amar focuses 
"exclusively on the last step of a multistep course of action by the 
police."151 As I argue above, this focus can be explained, at least in 
part, by his lack of interest in process values and by his overriding 
concern for his bottom line: the accuracy of the conviction. 
In addition, Afilar's attitudes toward causation shed light on his 
unwillingness to see linkages. Consider his attitude toward the 
fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. Amar takes issue with the 
doctrine because it would engender a "causation gap." In other 
words, it raises the possibility that suppression might occur in cases 
in which the primary illegality was not a but-for cause of the intro­
duction of its fruits into evidence.152 Based on the possibility of 
148. 446 U.S. 109 (1984). 
149. 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
150. Cf Kamisar, supra note 5, at 960. 
151. Id. 
152. The two examples he gives of evidence excludable because of a causation gap, see 
pp. 26-27, would both be admissible under current exceptions to the exclusionary rule: the 
good faith and independent source exceptions. 
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such situations, he would jettison the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree 
doctrine. This reasoning is unconvincing. The disagreement cannot 
really be about the mechanics and proof of but-for causation.153 As 
Justice Andrews explained in his dissent in Palsgraf,154 the length of 
the causal chain depends on what social goals we want to accom­
plish. In early exclusion decisions like Silverthorne, 155 the Court 
wanted to preserve the integrity of the courts by ensuring proper 
routes for review of evidence. In later decisions like Wong Sun,156 
the grounds for the poisonous tree doctrine had shifted, and the 
Court was concerned about deterring future police misconduct -
up to a point. Though Wong Sun is premised on the assumption 
that but for the initial illegality, the subsequent evidence would not 
have been obtained, the doctrine itself sweeps less broadly than 
would a but-for test.157 Yet it is still too broad for Amar's taste. He 
prefers to assume that, somehow, the truth will come out, justice 
will reign (pp. 26-27), and the causal link will not be provable. 
Amar says, "Consider . . .  the nice-sounding idea that government 
should not profit from its own wrongdoing. Our society, however, 
also cherishes the notion that cheaters - or murderers, or rapists, 
for that matter - should not prosper" (p. 26). The questions are, 
how much are we willing to trade to try to ensure that cheaters, 
murderers and rapists will not prosper? And when we have traded 
away so much that it interferes with our own prosperity and dignity, 
will there still be time to tum things around? 
As I discussed earlier, one of the values Amar is too willing to 
trade away is judicial integrity. Amar's "causation gap'" discussion 
is another example of his procliVity for .atomizing conduct. He will 
not make the causal link between police misconduct and the intro­
duction of the fruits of crime in court. On a purely descriptive 
level, he approaches the integrity of the judiciary as if it fl.oats free 
from the actions of other goverimlental entities - as if what hap­
pens on the street has no bearing on what happens in the court­
room. This approach is problematic not only because it views the 
court's integrity so narrowly, but also because of its implications for 
the deterrence rationale. Naturally, once one rejects the causal link 
between the introduction of evidence at trial and the improper 
153. Amar admits as much when he says "even if a defendant could conclusively establish 
but-for causation, the bloody knife should still come in as evidence." P. 27. 
154. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 104 {N.Y. 1928) {Andrews, J., dissenting). 
155. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
156. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 {1963). 
157. In Wong Sun, the police made a concededly illegal entry into the sleeping quarters of 
Toy. The police reaped several fruits from this entry, including narcotics and Wong Sun's 
confession. The Court recognized that Wong Sun's confession would not have been obtained 
had it not been for the illegal entry. Nevertheless, it found that, due to intervening circum­
stances, the confession was sufficiently attenuated from the initial illegality that police could 
not have predicted it at the time they entered Toy's residence. 371 U.S. at 491. 
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gathering of that evidence, exclusion will not seem like an effective 
way of deterring the police. 
2. Remedial Implications 
Amar uses a combination of current doctrine and proposals for 
reform to disconnect police misconduct from what occurs in court. 
For example, Amar thoroughly approves of the Court's current 
holding that a Fourth Amendment violation is complete at the time 
of the search or seizure, not when the evidence is introduced at 
trial.158 Conversely, although the Court finds that the Fifth Amend­
ment violation does occur when the confession is admitted at trial 
(p. 24), Amar suggests that we "enforce the clause itself by exclud­
ing confessions and allowing fruits" (p. 61). In the real world, the 
theoretical debate about when the violation is complete seems sin­
gularly unhelpful. As to all police investigative techniques, whether 
limited by the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments, or some combi­
nation of the three, a judicial open door policy creates obvious in­
centives for police. 
a. Deterrence. Amar ignores the evidence that police think 
about admissibility when performing searches and seizures as well 
as when eliciting confessions.159 He makes the point that police 
conducting Terry stops to keep the peace will not be deterred by the 
threat of exclusion (p. 157). But he says little about the converse 
point - that police usually conduct seizures, searches, and confes­
sions in order to gain admissible evidence leading to a conviction. 
Police, "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime,"160 are generally willing to conform to rules rather than lose 
evidence and convictions, but they cannot be expected to ignore 
gaping loopholes and incentives to cut comers. 
Recall the reaction to Mapp161 by urban police departments like 
New York and Los Angeles, who argued that with the advent of the 
exclusionary rule, they would for the first time have to begin follow­
ing the dictates of the Fourth Amendment.162 The rule deters, and 
disconnections between rule and remedy163 decrease deterrence.164 
158. P. 151 (discussing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-06 (1984)). 
159. See infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text. 
160. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
161. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
162. See Kamisar, supra note 26, at 43; Yale Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in Historical 
Perspective: the Struggle to Make the Fourth Amendment More Than 'an Empty Blessing,' 62 
JUDICATURE 337, 347-48 (1979). 
163. See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? 11vo 
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2466, 2532-51 (1996) (discussing the concept of 
"acoustic separation"). 
164. Amar claims that the rule both overdeters, by preventing any use of tainted evi­
dence, even if it might have come to light anyway, and underdeters, by permitting police to 
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If police want a confession, they may be willing to risk an illegal 
arrest since they can "cleanse" the illegality by transporting the sus­
pect to the station to interrogate him.165 Susan Klein talks about 
the Tucson Police Department's practice of interrogating suspects in 
violation of Miranda because they believed "that such statements 
might be held voluntary and thus could be used to impeach the de­
fendant, to keep him off the stand, or to deprive him of an insanity 
defense."166 United States v. Payner167 is a classic example of the 
knowing and cynical use of standing doctrine to insulate an illegal 
search from challenge and ensure that its fruits will be admissible. 
Theoretical distinctions about when the violation is complete fail to 
describe the complex interaction of multiple players using a variety 
of investigative techniques. 
Of course, Amar does recognize that police departments at 
times need systemic reform. His arguments for enterprise liability 
are powerful (p. 41), although it should be noted that once his sub­
stantive reforms were adopted, police departments would not be 
liable for all that much - mostly whatever a jury was willing to find 
unreasonable. But even as he takes Professor Stuntz and others to 
task for acting "as if the choice is tort law or exclusion" (p. 157), 
Amar demands a choice - tort law and enterprise liability instead 
of exclusion. What, then, is the probl�m with exclusion? Why is 
tort law, of all things, more desirable? 
b. Damages. Building on his assumption that the wrongs are 
discrete and unconnected, and look like private law wrongs, Amar 
argues that damages are a logical remedy. If the police officer was 
wrong to coerce a confession from the defendant, but there are no 
causal links among the interrogation, the actions of other officers in 
seizing its fruits, and the action of the court in introducing those 
fruits, then we are not dealing with a complex web of governmental 
hassle people from whom they expect to find no evidence. P. 157. The overdeterrence argu­
ment seems to ignore the significant limits the Court has placed on the exclusionary rule 
since Mapp. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), for example, permits the use of tainted 
evidence if it would have come to light absent the illegality. The underdeterrence argument 
has some truth to it; the exclusionary rule does not effectively deter police from hassling 
people in situations not likely to lead to evidence. But this observation does not support 
Amar's argument against the rule. First, Amar's proposals, such as damage actions, would be 
equally ineffective at deterring hassling. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. Second, 
if effective remedies for police hassling did exist, they could exist in tandem with the exclu­
sionary rule, rather than replace the rule. Cf. Meltzer, supra note 76, at 184-85 (discussing 
overdeterrence and underdeterrence objections). 
165. See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990); Steiker, supra note 163, at 2517. 
166. See Susan R. Klein, Miranda DeConstitutionalized: When the Self-Incrimination 
Clause and the Civil Rights Act Collide, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 417, 441 & n.98 (1994). See also 
Jan Hoffman, Police Tactics Chipping Away at Suspects' Rights, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 1998 
at 1 (reporting that in California, many police departments train officers that they have "little 
to lose and much to gain" by continuing to interrogate suspects despite invocation of Mi­
randa protections). 
167. 447 U.S. 727 (1980); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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misconduct, but simply a single wrongdoing officer. Why should he 
not simply be assessed damages, as if he were an ordinary batterer 
or trespasser? 
The problems with this formulation are both symbolic and 
highly pragmatic. As I discussed above,168 a tort judgment against 
an officer who is treated like a tortfeasor is not the same as a judg­
ment that a governmental official violated one's constitutional 
rights.169 Symbolically, the tort judgment fails to provide the 
"[a]f:firmation of the . . .  [r]ights"170 that the plaintiff is seeking and 
that permits the development of constitutional precedent. Practi­
cally, damages have not been shown to be an effective way of deter­
ring or reforming a governmental entity.111 
Amar argues that damages are needed in situations in which "a 
constitutional violation has already occurred out of court [so that] a 
court cannot really prevent it" (p. 116). This formulation speaks 
volumes about Amar's views on prevention and deterrence. Be­
cause he atomizes conduct so habitually, he has an extremely nar­
row idea of what can be prevented. If the police officer is not 
influenced fa his behavior by whether his coerced confession or ille­
gally seized contraband will be admissible at trial, then the officer's 
conduct cannot be prevented by threatening to exclude the evi­
dence. But in "[r]eal life" (p. 9), the officer is influenced by exclu­
sionary sanctions, and his conduct is therefore preventable. The 
admissjon of the evidence constitutes judicial default and judicial 
encouragement of illegality. It places the government's imprimatur 
on illegally obtained evidence in the case at bar, and it sends street­
level officers the unmistakable message that such evidence is also 
welcome in future cases.112 
c. The Private Attorney General. Amar recognizes that the 
criminal defendant is meant to be a sort of private attorney general 
but argues that he is "the worst kind" (p. 28). He is self-selected, 
168: See supra text accompanying notes 116-27. 
169. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 408-09 (Harlan, J., concurring); Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180; see 
also Dellinger, supra note 114, at 1537-39; supra text accompanying notes 116-23. 
170. Christina Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MrCH. L. REv. 5, 52 (1980) (discussing 
the importance of affirmation of the right); see also Susan Bandes, Monell, Parratt, Daniels, 
and Davidson: Distinguishing a Custom or Policy from a Random, Unauthorized Act, 72 
lowA L. REv. 101, 124 {1986). 
171. See PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 104 (1983); Bandes, supra note 170, at 
120-27; Whitman, supra note 170, at 42. 
172. See Arnold Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 
81 MrCH. L. REv. 1229, 1267 (1983) ("[I]t defies logic to believe that a policeman's willing­
ness to search without probable cause or a warrant (and therefore possibly subject an inno­
cent person to an unjustifiable intrusion of privacy) is unrelated to whether he can gain any 
admissible evidence from conducting the search."); see also Milton A. Loewenthal, Evaluat­
ing the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 49 UMKC L. REv. 24, 39 (1980) (arguing 
that the police "have great difficulty believing that standards can have any real meaning if the 
government can profit from violating them"). 
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self-serving, unrepresentative of law-abiding citizens, often despised 
by the public, unsophisticated, and focused only on exclusion, and 
he "rarely hires the best lawyer" (p. 28). The exclusionary rule re­
wards him "precisely because he is guilty" (p. 156). 
I wonder how many of these arguments Amar would counte­
nance in a noncriminal context. His criticism of the defendant has a 
number of odd features, for example. The ideal plaintiff usually is 
described as someone who will litigate the case strenuously, has 
concrete facts to litigate, and is in an adversarial position toward 
the opposing party.173 In all these regards, the criminal defendant 
seems to fit the bill. He certainly is adverse to the state, which 
seeks to convict and imprison him. He has a ripe case replete with 
concrete facts, and harm that is certain to occur if he loses. His 
motivation to litigate the case strenuously is his desire for liberty -
an impeccable motive at least as good as the pecuniary and prop­
erty interests the Court prefers.174 
Amar would prefer litigants like those "the NAACP sought out 
. . .  to revive the equal protection clause . . .  " (p. 28). I agree with 
him that ideological zeal can make for a good plaintiff,175 although 
he and I have the weight of Supreme Court precedent against us in 
this regard.176 But is it either necessary or workable to ask plain­
tiffs in precedent-setting cases to be motivated primarily by altru­
ism? In Mark Tushnet's book, Making Civil Rights Law, he 
recounts that when the NAACP Legal Defense Fund was mounting 
its legal attack on restrictive covenants, it often represented plain­
tiffs who were largely motivated by the desire to acquire a family 
home.177 In my own experience at the ACLU, I found my clients 
were motivated by a variety of complex motives, which could not be 
neatly separated into the self-serving and the altruistic. Would 
Amar suggest a litmus test for unselfish ideological · commitment 
when a Title VII plaintiff sued to get her job back, or a Nazi sued 
because he could not get a parade permit, or a victim of police bru­
tality sued for a large monetary award? Is it necessary to ask 
whether altruism was Webster Bivens's primary motivation for Sll;­
ing? Moreover, if altruism is the standard, it seems to comport 
173. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Susan 
Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REv. 227, 258·64 (1990). 
174. Notice that being "self-serving" in Amar's terms is not very different from being a 
plaintiff with a concrete stake in the outcome and the requisite adversarial zeal. 
175. See Bandes, supra note 173, at 258-63. 
176. See Wright, 468 U.S. at 751-56 (rejecting ideological motivations as a source of stand­
ing); Schlesinger v. Reservists Co=. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 219 (1974). 
177. See MARK V. TusHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 86-96 (1994); see also Truth­
Telling on Race, THE NATION, Dec. 15, 1997, at 3 (recounting Thurgood Marshall's struggle 
to represent plaintiffs "more interested in acquiring a family home than in advancing civil 
rights through a test case"). 
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poorly with Amar's preferred tort vehicle, which provides only 
money damages as a remedy. 
What of Amar's claim that the criminal defendant is the "worst 
kind" of private attorney general because he is unsophisticated and 
cannot afford the best lawyer? On its face, this assertion is highly 
questionable. Even apart from those who can afford the Johnny 
Cochrans and Barry Schecks who litigate strenuously in criminal 
cases, criminal defendants have the right to representation by the 
public defender's office - a group of lawyers with a high level of 
expertise in criminal matters.178 In any case, in what other legal 
field would Amar require a litigant to be sophisticated and flush 
enough to afford expensive representation? Is he really suggesting 
a standard whereby precedent should be made by those who can 
afford the best lawyers, rather than those who themselves possess 
the characteristics of good plaintiffs? 
Amar's attitude toward private attorneys general in the criminal 
context is ambivalent at best. He likens the exclusionary rule to 
playing the "Leavenworth lottery," which he describes as: "Be­
cause the government violated the constitutional rights of A, judges 
spin the wheel and spring some lucky (but unrelated) convict B 
from Leavenworth" (pp. 151-52). But in a sense, what he describes 
here is the private attorney general mechanism, which permits A to 
make law that will also affect unrelated B. Indeed, it also describes 
a number of other mechanisms for judicial norm creation and en­
forcement, including injunctive relief, the overbreadth doctrine, the 
Bivens remedy, class action suits, and the very act of setting prece­
dent which will bind future litigants.179 It would be difficult to find 
a case in which only A was affected, though such a case would more 
likely be a private law matter than one in which constitutional is­
sues were litigated. I do not think Amar's objection is really di­
rected at most private attorneys general, but at "convicts" who get 
"lucky" and are sprung from prison.180 
Amar's complaints about criminal defendants as private attor­
neys general are not, I think, importable to noncriminal contexts. 
The key phrases here are that the defendant is "despised by the 
public," "unrepresentative of the larger class of law-abiding citi-
178. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 402 N.E.2d 157, {1979) (refusing to adopt a per se rule 
against appointment of the public defender when another member of the same office has a 
conflict with the case). The Illinois Supreme Court said, "In many instances the application 
of such a per se rule would require the appointment of counsel with virtually no experience in 
the trial of criminal matters, thus raising, with justification, the question of competency of 
counsel." 402 N.E.2d at 162. 
179. See Bandes, supra note 173. 
180. If the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally based - an assumption I reject, see 
Bandes, supra note 114, at 336 n.225 - then not only is the Leavenworth lottery illegitimate, 
but so is the Court's attempt to make the rule binding on state actors. 
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zens," and rewarded "precisely because he is guilty" (pp. 28, 156). 
The complaint is really the familiar one - the true first principle of 
Amar's book - that criminals should not walk. But people who 
are despised are often precedent-setting litigants - witness the 
prevalence of Jehovah's Witnesses and communists in the United 
States Reports.181 Some might be rightly despised, such as Nazis 
and racists,182 and some might be wrongly despised. Some of the 
wrongly despised are lawbreakers - like Hardwick,183 or Baird,184 
or Shuttlesworth.185 The dividing lines are not as clear as Amar 
implies. He apparently does truly believe that he can draw a circle 
around "We the People" and shut others out;186 that inside the cir­
cle are those "good" colonial lawbreakers like John Peter Zenger, 
William Penn and John Wilkes, and all the rest of us who deserve to 
be safe in our houses, papers, and effects; and that outside the circle 
are the bad guys who should be denied protection to the fullest 
extent possible without infringing on the rest of us. 
CONCLUSION 
In a lecture he gave in 1994, Amar offered five lessons about the 
Bill of Rights, and about communicating the teachings of the Bill of 
Rights. The lessons were entitled: (1) keep it simple; (2) find the 
big idea; (3) tell a story; ( 4) connect the dots; and (5) remember the 
People.187 In First Principles, Amar has had mixed results in living 
up to these lessons. He has told a simple, powerful, and under­
standable story about the criminal procedure amendments - one 
which "will be comprehensible to ordinary citizens"188 and scholars 
alike. He has centered it around a big idea, or group of core con­
cepts, about the rights involved. He has done so "in a way that 
others may learn from or clearly take issue with."189 On all these 
181. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (involving Jehovah's Witnesses); Yates 
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (considering Co=unists); Dennis v. United States, 341 
U.S. 494 (1951) (involving Co=unists); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ; v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943) (regarding Jehovah's Witnesses); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) 
(involving Jehovah's Witnesses); see also Fredrick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HAR.v. L. 
REv. 361, 377 (1985) (observing that free speech claims are often brought by members of 
unpopular groups like Hare Krishnas and Jehovah's Witnesses, and by "the wicked," such as 
Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan). 
182. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (involving a member of the Ku Klux 
Klan). 
183. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
184. See Belloti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976). 
185. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). 
186. See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out": Assimilation, 
Indoctrination and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HAR.v. L. REv. 581 (1993). 
187. See Amar, supra note 83, at 585-86. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
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grounds, he has succeeded admirably. But I do not believe he has 
connected the dots. Amar says the Constitution is not a grab bag of 
separate, unrelated clauses, but a central weakness of his analysis is 
that he does reserve these three amendments for separate treat­
ment, despite his protestations to the contrary. His treatment of 
these amendments, and the protections they afford, is inseparable 
from the other weaknesses in his book. The story he tells is too 
simple. It sacrifices the complexity of governmental conduct and 
the play of competing societal forces for a clean narrative line 
whose very simplicity is dangerous - because it confirms fears and 
prejudices that thrive on oversimplification. The most dangerous 
oversimplification of all is his failure to heed his own admonition to 
"remember the people." He does not see that "We the People" 
includes us all. 
